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MAY DESEGREGATION REMEDIES INFRINGE THE
RIGHTS OF INNOCENT WHITES? THE




A large number of segregated academies grew up in the South in the
1960s and hampered the Supreme Court's efforts to carry out the man-
date of Brown v. Board of Education' to abolish racial discrimination in
education. In 1976, the Court held in Runyon v. McCrary2 that section
1981, 3 derived from the 1866 Civil Rights Act4 and the enforcement
clause of the thirteenth amendment, 5 prohibits racially discriminatory
admissions procedures in commercially operated, non-sectarian private
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Despite the 1954 decision that separate but equal education is
innately unequal and a violation of the equal protection clause, Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare statistics indicated in 1973 that approximately 50% of the black
students in the United States attended public schools that were more than 80% black. U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., & WELFARE, DIGEST OF EDUCATIONAL STATISTICS 154 (1973).
2. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same
right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be
parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceed-
ings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exac-
tions of every kind, and to no other.
4. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 &
1982 (1970)). Section 1 of the Act provided:
That all persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power,
excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United
States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous
condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in
every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
5. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIII provides: "Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
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schools. By employing section 1981 and the thirteenth amendment to
attack segregation in these schools, the Court remained faithful to its
course of self-restraint in applying the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause. 6 Yet, it also provided Congress with a constitutional
basis to enact nation-wide, remedial legislation to abolish the conse-
quences of past and present racial discrimination in education, employ-
ment, and housing. 7
This Note discusses the problem of racially segregated private schools,
examines the constitutional theories under which the Court could have
prohibited racial discrimination in private academies, and offers an
explanation for the Court's choice of section 1981 and the thirteenth
amendment. The implications of the Court's holding in McCrary for the
constitutionally protected rights of association, privacy, and liberty are
then considered. This Note concludes by exploring the ramifications of
the Court's reasoning for court-ordered and legislative affirmative action
and racial quota programs in education, housing, and employment.
II. THE SETING
A. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.
In 1968, the Supreme Court held in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.8
that section 1982, 9 derived from section 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights
Act, "bars all racial discrimination, private as well as public, in the sale
or rental of real property."10 This decision gave new meaning to the
thirteenth amendment, the 1866 Civil Rights Act, and sections 1981 and
1982.
The Court reasoned that although section 1 of the thirteenth amend-
ment only outlawed slavery and involuntary servitude, section 2 em-
powered Congress to determine the badges and incidents of slavery and
enact "all laws necessary and proper for their abolition."" As long as
the congressional determination was rational, the Court would uphold
it." Jones held that Congress, in 1866, rationally could have concluded
6. See notes 39-44, 72-123 supra and accompanying text.
7. See notes 217-63 supra and accompanying text.
8. 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (real estate company refused to sell house to plaintiff because
he was black).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970) provides: "All citizens of the United States shall have the
same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
10. 392 U.S. at 413.
11. Id. at 439 (quoting Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883)).
12. The Court stated the test:
[Vol. 1978:211
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that racial discrimination in the sale or lease of private property was a
badge or "relic of slavery" 13 and thus prohibited it in section 1 of the
1866 Civil Rights Act.14
In reaching its decision, the Jones Court overruled Hodges v. United
States. 15 The trial court in Hodges had held that a conspiracy by a group
of whites to prevent several blacks from contracting for employment 16
violated section 1981. Although the Supreme Court recognized that the
inability to make contracts was a badge of slavery, it reversed and held
that Congress was only empowered by the thirteenth amendment to
proscribe conduct that enslaved.17 Because "no mere personal assault or
trespass or appropriation operates to reduce the individual to a condition
of slavery,"' 18 the Court concluded, section 1981 did not proscribe the
defendants' conduct.
Subsequent cases held that Congress' power under the thirteenth
amendment extended only to the abolition of "enforced compulsory
service."' 19 In 1948, the Court held in Hurd v. Hodges2" that the 1866
Civil Rights Act was constitutionally based on the fourteenth amendment
and, therefore, only applied to state action. 21 By overruling Hodges v.
Representative Wilson of Iowa was the floor manager in the House for the
Civil Rights Act of 1866. In urging that Congress had ample authority to pass the
pending bill, he recalled the celebrated words of Chief Justice Marshall in
McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat 316. . .: " 'Let the end be legitimate, let it be
within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the Constitution are constitutional.' The end is legitimate," the
Congressman said, "because it is defined by the Constitution itself. The end is
the maintenance of freedom. . . .A man who enjoys the civil rights mentioned
in this bill cannot be reduced to slavery. . . .This settles the appropriateness of
this measure, and that settles its constitutionality." We agree.
392 U.S. at 443-44.
13. Id. at 443.
14. Id. at 444.
15. 201 U.S. 1 (1906).
16. Jones, 392 U.S. at 441 n.78.
17. 201 U.S. at 16-17.
18. Id. at 18.
19. See, e.g., Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926) (restrictive covenant not
prohibited by § 1981).
20. 334 U.S. 24 (1948).
21. Id. at 30 n.7. The Court held that § 1977, now § 1981, derived from §-16 of the Act
of 1870, enacted after the fourteenth amendment had been adopted, and was only pattern-
ed after § 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act. Id. In fact, the Court explained:
Both the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the joint resolution which was later
adopted as the Fourteenth Amendment were passed in the first session of the
Thirty-Ninth Congress. Frequent references to the Civil Rights Act are to be
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United States, the Jones majority held that section 1981, like section
1982, was derived from the 1866 Act and the thirteenth amendment. The
Court failed to consider, however, whether section 1981 prohibited racial
discrimination in private contracting and what constituted a contract. 22
B. The 1964 Civil Rights Act and the "New" Equal Protection
Analysis
During the 1960s and early 1970s, the Court, for several reasons, was
able to prohibit racial discrimination in extensive areas of private conduct
without extending its highly criticized Jones reasoning23 to private
found in the record of the legislative debates on the adoption of the Amendment.
It is clear that in many significant respects the statute and the Amendment were
expressions of the same general congressional policy. Indeed, as the legislative
debates reveal, one of the primary purposes of many members of Congress in
supporting the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment was to incorporate
the guaranties of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in the organic law of the land.
Id. at 32.
22. 392 U.S. at 441 n.78. The Court simply stated:
The conclusion of the majority in Hodges rested upon a concept of congres-
sional power under the Thirteenth Amendment irreconcilable with the position
taken by every member of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases and incompatible
with the history and purpose of the Amendment itself. Insofar as Hodges is
inconsistent with our holding today, it is hereby overruled.
Id.
23. Justice Harlan, dissenting in Jones, concluded that the language of § 1982 is
ambiguous. Id. at 452-53. The statute either guaranteed a right of equal status to all under
the law and therefore prohibited only state sanctioned discrimination, or was an absolute
right enforceable against private discrimination as well. In terms of the language alone, he
concluded that the former interpretation was more convincing. Id. at 453. Furthermore,
the alternative interpretation was "open to the most serious doubt" in view of the
individualistic ethic of most of the legislators who enacted the thirteenth amendment, and
the 1866 Civil Rights Act from which § 1982 is derived. Id. at 473. He noted:
It seems to me that most of these men would have regarded it as a great intrusion
on individual liberty for the Government to take from a man the power to refuse
for personal reasons to enter into a purely private transaction involving the
disposition of property, albeit those personal reasons might reflect racial bias. It
should be remembered that racial prejudice was not uncommon in 1866, even
outside the South.
Id. at 473-74. The following commentators support the majority's position in Jones: Kohl,
The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come Round At Last: Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 55 VA. L. REV. 272 (1969); Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination:
The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74
COLUM. L. REV. 449, 450-79 (1974); Note, Section 1981 and Private Discrimination: An
Historical Justification for a Judicial Trend, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1024 (1972). Au-
thorities supporting the dissent's interpretation include: Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Cleo
Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 89; Ervin, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co.: Judicial Activism Run Riot, 22 VAND. L. REV. 485 (1969); Henkin, The Supreme
Court, 1967 Term-Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 82-91 (1968);
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contracting. The 1964 Civil Rights Act, 24 particularly Titles I125 and
V1126 which are constitutionally based on the commerce clause 27 and
prohibit discrimination in public accommodations and employment, was
broadly construed by the Court.28 Many lower courts assumed the 1964
Act, which provides a comprehensive remedy for private discrimination,
replaced the 1866 Civil Rights Act. 29 In addition, the Court's expansion
of the state action" and public function"1 doctrines during the 1960s and
early 1970s enabled it to strike down private racial discrimination that
violated the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.32 Further-
more, the Court creatively employed its "new" equal protection analy-
sis33 to outlaw state and federal legislation that infringed fundamental
24. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 28, & 42
U.S.C.).
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(b)(l)-(4), (c)(l)-(4) (1970). The public accommodations section
has a private club exemption, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1970), which provides:
The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to a private club or other
establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent that the facilities
of such establishment are made available to the customers or patrons of an
establishment within the scope of subsection (b) of this section.
26. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (Supp. V 1975). Title VII prohibits discrimination in
employment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. It covers only
employers in interstate commerce with fifteen or more employees, and it establishes
administrative procedures for conciliation and redress of grievances.
27. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, empowers Congress "to regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes."
28. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241
(1964).
29. See Note, Desegregation of Private Schools: Is Section 1981 the Answer?, 48
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1147, 1160-61 (1973).
30. The Court has held that when the state is sufficiently involved with otherwise
private entities, those entities can be held accountable under the fourteenth amendment.
The Court, however, has required varying levels of "sufficient" state involvement.
Compare Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369
(1967), and Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964), with Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
31. The Court has ruled that otherwise private entities can be subjected to fourteenth
amendment limitations when they exercise powers or functions governmental in nature.
See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296,299 (1966); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506-07
(1946). See generally Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword: Equal Citizenship
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 35-38 (1977); Yackle, The Burger
Court, "State Action, " and Congressional Enforcement of the Civil War Amendments, 27
ALA. L. REV. 479, 479-507 (1975).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I provides in pertinent part that "[n]o State shall...
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
33. See generally Barrett, Judicial Supervision of Legislative Classification-A More
Modest Role for Equal Protection?, 1976 B.Y.U.L. REV. 89; Dixon, The Supreme Court
and Equality: Legislative Classifications, Desegregation, and Reverse Discrimination, 62
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interests34 and suspect classifications,35 absent a compelling governmen-
tal interest to justify it. 36 Although a fourteenth amendment violation
requires proof of an intent or purpose to discriminate,37 the Warren Court
CORNELL L. REV. 494 (1977); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection,
86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972).
34. Interests that the Court has held to be fundamental include the right to procreate
(Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)); the right to vote (Dunn v.
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965)); the right to travel (Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)); and, arguably, some aspects of
privacy (Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)).
See Goodpaster, The Constitutional and Fundamental Rights, 15 ARIz. L. REv. 480
(1973).
35. The Court has held that groups with certain characteristics have been peculiarly
burdened and are entitled to special protection. Therefore, classifications based on race
(Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)); alienage (Indiana Real Estate Comm'n v. Satoskar,
417 U.S. 938 (1974)); nationality (Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410
(1948)); and illegitimacy (Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974)) are closely
scrutinized.
36. Absent a compelling reason for the infringement, the state action will be held
unconstitutional; only rarely has a state met this burden. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting): "To challenge such lines by the 'compelling state
interest' standard is to condemn them all. So far as I am aware, no state law has ever
satisfied this seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever will, for it de-
mands nothing less than perfection." Id. at 363-64. But see Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944) (holding race classification was necessary for national security during
World War II); Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915) (holding restriction on employ-
ment of aliens was necessary for welfare of unemployed U.S. citizens). Several recent
cases involving relatively minor inhibitions on fundamental interests such as petition
requirements have survived the compelling state interest-strict scrutiny requirement.
See American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431
(1971); 53 N.C.L. REv. 430 (1974).
37. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). The Court stated:
The central purpose of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment is the prevention of official conduct discriminating on the basis of
race. . . . [O]ur cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or other
official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory pur-
pose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.
[W]e have not held that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise
within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race than
another. Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole touch-
stone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution. Stand-
ing alone, it does not trigger the rule . . . that racial classifications are to be
subjected to the strictest scrutiny and are justifiable only by the weightiest of
considerations.
Id. at 239, 242. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S.
398 (1945); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (proof of intent to discriminate
required in jury selection cases).
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willingly inferred a discriminatory intent from statistical evidence dem-
onstrating that an act or program had a racially disproportionate effect.3 8
Since 1973, however, the Court has demonstrated a renewed apprecia-
tion for the principles of "Our Federalism,"3 9 and great deference to
state legislative choices. 40 It is no longer expanding its fundamental
interest 41 and suspect classification4 2 analyses, nor its state action and
38. See Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972), in wiich the Court in-
dicated that in certain circumstances, a law's racial impact, rather than its purpose,
established an equal protection violation. In Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), the
Court warned against deciding cases on the basis of anything as ambiguous and elusive as
legislative intent or motive. Clearly, if legislative purpose could not be considered, the
Court would be forced to rely on the challenged statute's effect or impact. This tendency
was especially evident in the school desegregation decisions. See Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I
(1971); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
39. See Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1118 (1977). Justice Black, for the
Court in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), held that a criminal prosecution pending in
a tate court barred a defendant from seeking injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in
federal court except in the most extraordinary cases. "Our Federalism," a concept
derived from the Anti-Injunction Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), made any interference
by the federal judiciary in state court proceedings a "serious matter;" therefore, only if a
defendant would suffer irreparable injury "both great and immediate" would federal
equitable relief be granted. 401 U.S. at 42-46.
The Court recently extended the Younger holding to cases in which state civil prosecu-
tions are pending, Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Wooley v. Maynard, 430
U.S. 705 (1977); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977), and read in an exhaustion of state
remedies requirement, Huffman v. Pursue, 420 U.S. 592 (1975). Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976) (if convicted defendant had an opportunity tb litigate a fourth amendment
claim in a state court proceeding, it can not be relitigated in federal court on a writ of
habeas corpus).
40. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (tenth amendment,
which embodies principles of federalism, affirmatively limits commerce power);
San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (Justice Powell
noted the delicate questions of local autonomy and federalism and upheld the local
property tax system of financing public education). See generally Karst, supra note 31;
Yackle, supra note 31.
41. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); Weinberger
v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974); 89
HARV. L. REV. 95 (1975); 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 140.
42. A possible exception to this is classification on the basis of sex. In Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), a plurality opinion held that sex was a suspect class. In
subsequent cases the Court retreated, but its analysis in Craig v. Boren, 425 U.S. 190
(1976); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975);
and Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), implicitly holds that sex is a suspect class. See
Barrett, supra note 33; Ginsberg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REV. I
(1975); Karst, supra note 31, at 54-55; The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV.
70 (1977); 89 HARV. L. REV. 95 (1975). But see Karst, supra note 31, at 31 (although the
Supreme Court is not expanding the fundamental interest category under the fourteenth
amendment, it has retained and expanded the suspect classification category under the
fourteenth amendment's due process clause).Washington University Open Scholarship
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public function doctrines;43 moreover, proof of actual intent or purpose to
discriminate is required to establish an equal protection violation."4
Because the Court thus limited the fourteenth amendment, discrimination
in private contracting could be attacked only under the 1964 Civil Rights
Act and, if the Court was willing, section 1981.
C. Title VII, Section 1981, and the Equal Protection Clause: A Prob-
lem of Proof
The Supreme Court held in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 41 that the
purpose of Title VII was not only to punish an intent to discriminate, but
also to rectify the consequences of discriminatory employment prac-
tices. 6 Courts, therefore, had to examine "practices, procedures, or tests
neutral in terms of intent" and invalidate any that had the effect of
"[freezing] the status quo of prior discriminatory employment prac-
tices." 47 Under the Griggs test, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case
of employment discrimination by showing that a hiring or promotional
test or policy had a racially disproportionate impact.48 Courts will infer
an intent to discriminate4 9 and outlaw the challenged action unless the
43. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345 (1974); CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973); Karst,
supra note 31, at 37-39; Yackle, supra note 31, at 507-26; Note, State Action and the
Burger Court, 60 VA. L. REV. 840 (1974).
44. See Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990, 991(1977)
(vacating and remanding) (Powell, J., concurring); Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ.
v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Hills v.
Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 727 (1974). But see
Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (Court relied almost entirely on disproportionate
racial impact in holding Texas county had discriminated in grand jury selection).
45. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
46. Id. at 432.
47. Id. at 430. The Court stated that an employer's subjective good intent was
immaterial if the employment procedure or testing device operated as a "built-in head-
wind" for minority groups and was unrelated to job performance or ability. Id. at 432.
48. Id. at 431. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973);
Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377, 1382 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 982 (1972).
49. As the Fourth Circuit noted in Brown v. Gaston County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457
F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972), proof of overt racial discrimination
in employment is almost never direct. To require alleged victims of employment discrimi-
nation to prove intent or purpose to discriminate would effectively emasculate Title VII.
Therefore, courts have interpreted the statute to allow them to examine facially neutral
patterns, practices, general policies, and statistics for evidence of racially discriminatory
effect. The Supreme Court affirmed this practice in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976), stating: "[E]mployees or applicants proceeding under [Title VII] need not concern
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss1/11
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defendant employer demonstrates a significant relationship between the
practice and job performance.:
Title VII, however, contains significant statutory limitations. It applies
only to employers engaged in interstate commerce who employ fifteen or
more workers 5 and excludes private clubs.52 In addition, although Title
VII offers investigative, conciliatory, and legal assistance, as well as
waiver of court costs and attorneys' fees, it requires a plaintiff alleging a
Title VII violation to conform to onerous procedural requirements. 53 As a
result of these limitations, plaintiffs gradually brought employment dis-
crimination claims under section 1981 and forced lower federal courts to
consider its scope and relationship to Title VII. 54 Relying on the Court's
reversal of Hodges v. United States in Jones,5 these courts held that
section 1981 prohibited racial discrimination in private56 -especially
themselves with an employer's possibly discriminatory purpose but instead may focus
solely on the racially differential impact of the challenged hiring or promotion practices."
Id. at 238-39. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Robinson
v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 794-800 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971);
Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 983, 996-97
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
50. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 432. In Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,
444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971), the court articulated the
test:
The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose such
that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business.
Thus, the business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override any racial
impact; the challenged practice must effectively carry out the business purpose it
is alleged to serve; and there must be available no acceptable alternative policies
or practices which would better accomplish the business purpose advanced, or
accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential racial impact.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1970).
52. Id.
53. See Peck, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Developments in the
Administrative Process 1965-1975, 51 WASH. L. REV. 831 (1976); Note, Limitation Periods
for Filing a Charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 56 B.U.L. REV. 760 (1976).
54. The language of §§ 1981 and 1982 are so similar that plaintiffs, citing Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer, Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), brought § 1981 actions charging discrimination
in private contracting. In a leading case, Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l
Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911 (1970), the Seventh
Circuit held that § 1981 was derived from the 1866 Civil Rights Act and prohibited private
employment discrimination because the legislative history of that Act contained specific
references to labor contracts. 427 F.2d at 483. See generally Larsen, The New Law of Race
Relations, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 470; Note, Is Section 1981 Modified By Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964?, 1970 DUKE L.J. 1223; Note, supra note 29; Note, Racial Discrimina-
tion in Employment Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 615 (1969).
55. See notes 15-19 supra and accompanying text.
56. Section 1981 and Title II were made alternate grounds for holdings in Scott v.
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employment57-contracting. 58 In Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., the Supreme Court confirmed that section 1981 provided an
independent remedy for discrimination in private employment.
Following Johnson, courts began defining the proof required to estab-
lish a statutory violation. Because section 1981 contains no "intent to
discriminate" requirement and, like section 1982, affords all people an
equal opportunity to obtain the "benefits of American life," courts held
Young, 421 F.2d 143 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970) (privately owned
recreation facility prohibited from admitting whites for a fee while excluding blacks);
Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of the Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Conn. 1974)
(private fraternal organization may exclude blacks under private club exception of Title II
and under § 1981, which court held to contain by implication a similar exception); Sims v.
Order of United Commercial Travelers, 343 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1972) (defendant not a
private club and could not refuse to enter into an insurance contract with plaintiff for
racial reasons); United States v. Medical Soc'y, 298 F. Supp. 145 (D.S.C. 1969) (private
hospital may not racially discriminate in admitting patients). See Grier v. Specialized
Skills, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 856 (W.D.N.C. 1971) (barber school that refused to admit blacks
either as students or as customers violated § 1981 and, under the public function doctrine,
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. But see Cook v. Advertiser Co., 323
F. Supp. 1212 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972) (right of newspaper to
maintain all white society page does not violate § 1981 because statute applies only to state
action).
57. See Faraca v. Clements, 506 F.2d 956 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1006
(1975); Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1972); Brown v. Gaston
County Dyeing Mach. Co., 457 F.2d 1377 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1972);
Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); Caldwell v.
National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 916 (1972);
Young v. IT&T, 438 F.2d 757 (3d Cir. 1971); Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contract-
ing Co., 437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 431 F.2d 1097 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971); Long v. Ford Motor Co., 352 F. Supp. 135
(E.D. Mich. 1972), modified, 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974).
58. See cases cited in notes 56-57 supra. Although a few courts held that § 1981
prohibited sex discrimination in employment, see, e.g., Parmer v. National Cash Register
Co., 346 F. Supp. 1043, 1047 (S.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd per curiam, 503 F.2d 275 (6th Cir.
1974), most courts restricted § 1981 to race. See generally Note, The Expanding Scope of
Section 1981: Assault on Private Discrimination and a Cloud on Affirmative Action, 90
HARV. L. REV. 412 (1976).
59. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
60. Id. at 459-60, 470-77. Justice Marshall, concurring, stated:
A full exposition of the statutory origins of § 1981 with respect to prohibition
against private acts of discrimination is set out in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. In
construing § 1982, a sister provision to § 1981, we concluded that Congress
intended to prevent private discriminatory deprivations of all the rights
enumerated in § I of the 1866 Act, including the right to contract. The Court's
recognition of a proscription in § 1981 against private acts of employment
discrimination . . . reaffirms that the early Civil Rights Acts reflect congres-
sional intent to "speak . . . of all deprivations . . . whatever their source."
Id. at 471 (emphasis in original) (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 97 (1971)).
But see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160,,193-95 (White, J., dissenting).
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that section 1981 prohibited subtle as well as blatant discrimination.61
Evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie claim under Title VII,
which prohibited similar discrimination, would therefore establish a
section 1981 claim and cause a similar burden of proof shift to the
employer. 62
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the proof required to establish a
prima facie case of racial discrimination in contracting in violation of a
plaintiff's fourteenth amendment or statutory rights was virtually identi-
cal. 63 Recently, however, the Court has narrowed the scope of the equal
protection clause and is requiring proof of a discriminatory intent or
purpose to sustain a fourteenth amendment violation. 64 It has thus distin-
guished, in terms of proof, a violation of a statute based on the commerce
clause or thirteenth amendment from a fourteenth amendment violation.
In Washington v. Davis,65 the Court articulated this distinction. 66
61. See, e.g., Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974).
When an employer, public or private, places more stringent requirements on
employees because of their race, Section 1981 is violated. The purpose for which
the section was enacted-to afford equal opportunities to secure the benefits of
American life regardless of race-requires that courts adopt a broad outlook in
enforcing Section 1981. Schemes of discrimination, whether blatant or subtle,
are forbidden.
Id. at 505; Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950
(1972).
62. See Long v. Ford Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974). "Although McDonnell
Douglas was a Title VII case, the principles governing these procedural matters apply
with equal force to a § 1981 action." Id. at 505 n.11.
A person alleging a § 1981 violation must first establish that his employment
terms vary from those which his employer accords to similarly situated white
workers. This can be shown by proof either that intentional racial prejudice
entered into his treatment or that a facially neutral practice . . . operates dis-
criminatorily against minority employees.
Id. at 505-06. "If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of dissimilar treatment due in
part to racial discrimination, the defendant employer must establish some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its action." Id. at 501.
In Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
920 (1976), the court emphasized the need for similar treatment of § 1981 and Title VII:
Relief under § 1981 is limited to correcting racial discrimination . . . .But
apart from this, Title VII and § 1981 provide complementary remedies for
employment discrimination. ...Moreover, "in fashioning a substantive body
of law under § 1981, courts should, in an effort to avoid undesirable substantive
law conflicts, look to the principles of law created under Title VII for direction."
Id. at 270 (quoting Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d
1309, 1316 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976).
63. See notes 37-38, 48-50, 61-62 supra and accompanying text.
64. See notes 39-44 supra and accompanying text.
65. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
66. Id. at 242-44. The Court acknowledged that its decisions in Palmer v. Thompson,
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Plaintiffs claimed that a qualifying test required of all applicants for the
position of police officer in the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police
Department violated the equal protection clause because, although facial-
ly neutral, it had a disproportionate racial impact. Whereas the plaintiffs
could establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title
VII67 by showing that four times as many blacks failed the entrance
examination as did whites, the Court held that plaintiffs had to demon-
strate that the defendants intended to engage in racial discrimination to
prove a fourteenth amendment violation. 68
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp.,69 the Court elaborated on factors that might be sufficient to prove
discriminatory intent. Although an official act resulting in a dispropor-
tionate racial impact is sufficient to alert a court to a possible violation,
the court must consider the history of the challenged act, the specific
antecedent events, any departures from normal procedures, and contem-
porary statements of decisionmakers to determine whether a racially
discriminatory intent exists. 70 The Court concluded that "[a]bsent a
pattern as stark as that in Gomillion or Yick Wo, impact alone is not
determinative, and the Court must look to other evidence." 71
403 U.S. 217 (1971), and Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972), might have
suggested that "in proper circumstances, the racial impact of a law, rather than its
discriminatory purpose," was the controlling factor. Id. at 243. But surely Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973), signalled "[t]hat neither Palmer nor Wright was
understood to have changed the prevailing rule .... Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at
243.
67. Although Davis is a Title VII case, lower courts have held that proof sufficient to
establish a Title VII claim is adequate to establish a § 1981 violation, see note 62 supra. It
would therefore seem to follow that, in distinguishing Title VII from the fourteenth
amendment, the Court also distinguished a § 1981 violation, based on the thirteenth
amendment, from the fourteenth amendment.
68. 426 U.S. at 238-39. Absent this requirement, the Court reasoned, a parade of tax,
welfare, regulatory, and licensing statutes that'dispropoitionately burden the poor and
blacks would be invalid. Id. at 248 n.14.
69. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
70. Id. at 264-68.
71. Id. at 266. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977), a fourteenth amendment
case involving a challenge to Texas' system of selecting grand juries, which seemed to
treat disproportionate impact differently. This case may, however, fit within the excep-
tion specifically reserved in Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266 n.13, and
in Davis, 426 U.S. at 241. The Court held that because jury selection is supposed to
be random, a substantial racial disproportion in jury selection establishes a prima facie
case of discriminatory intent, constituting an equal protection violation unless rebutted.
See The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, supra note 42, at 163-76 (1977).
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II. THE PROBLEM
The tremendous growth of private schools in the South correlated
directly with the vigor of federal enforcement of racial desegregation in
public schools.7 2 Although Brown v. Board of Education7 3 mandated a
unitary public school system, the Court did not begin to enforce this
mandate aggressively until 1968 in Green v. County School Board.74
Finding a discriminatory intent with relative ease in Green and subse-
quent school desegregation cases, 75 the Court authorized broad remedial
orders aimed at eliminating segregation in southern public schools. 76 In
response to these desegregation efforts, the estimated enrollment in
southern private schools increased from approximately 25,000 in 1966,
to approximately 535,000 in 1972. 77 The transfer rate to these "segrega-
72. For a discussion of the problem of segregated private schools, see J. PALMER, THE
IMPACT OF PRIVATE EDUCATION ON THE RURAL SOUTH (1974); Note, Desegregation of
Private Schools: Section 1981 as an Alternative to State Action, 62 GEO. L.J. 1363 (1974);
Note, supra note 29; Note, Post-Brown Private White Schools-An Imperfect Dualism, 26
VAND. L. REV. 587 (1973); Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups: The Right to Discrimi-
nate Versus Freedom from Discrimination, 84 YALE L.J. 1441 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Section 1981 and Private Groups]; Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, 82
YALE L.J. 1436 (1973).
73. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
74. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). In Green the Court confronted a "freedom-of-choice" plan
for desegregating the two public schools of New Kent County, Virginia. After operating
the plan for three years, 85% of the black students in the school system continued to
attend all-black schools. The Court held that "a plan that at this late date fails to provide
meaningful assurance of prompt and effective disestablishment of a dual system is...
intolerable. . . .The burden on a school board today is to come forward with a plan that
promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now." Id, at 438-39
(emphasis in original).
75. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189,201-05 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 6-14 (1971); notes 37-38 supra and accompanying
text.
76. From 1965 to 1973 the percentage of southern blacks who attended all-black
public schools dropped from 84.9 to 9.2 percent. Note, Segregation Academies and State
Action, supra note 72, at 1436.
77. See Terjen, Close-up on Segregation Academies, NEW SOUTH 50 (Fall 1972), cited
in Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, supra note 72, at 1441. The Wall Street
Journal reported that total enrollment in private schools in the South rose from 610,000 to
859,000 students-a 41% increase-in the four years after Green. Wall St. J., Dec. 17,
1973, at 17, col. 3.
M. Giles, D. Gatlin, & E. Cataldo, Executive Summary Determinants of Resegrega-
tion: Compliance/Rejection Behavior and Policy Alternatives (National Science Founda-
tion RANN-Research Applications Directorate, Division of Advanced Productivity Re-
search and Technology, April 29, 1976) undertook a four year project to examine factors
influencing parental resistance to school desegregation in seven desegregated school
districts in Florida. They noted:
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tion academies"7 occasionally produced a significant alteration in the
school district's racial composition and thwarted court attempts to elimi-
nate all-black public schools.7 9 Withdrawal of white students frequently
resulted in a decrease in state funds for public schools, a reduction of
discretionary educational programs by local school boards, and a rejec-
tion by the electorate of bond issues previously readily approved.8s
Despite court efforts, therefore, the pre-Brown separate but equal
facilities remained substantially separate and grew increasingly
unequal."
The Court was confronted with a dilemma: Brown held that a dual
school system was innately unequal. Yet, in the face of white student
flight to private schools, a unitary public school system could be
achieved only by increasingly drastic desegregation orders, including
extensive busing plans. Such orders in turn hastened the white student
exodus to private schools. 82 The Court, to be faithful to Brown, was
compelled to find a constitutional basis on which it could directly attack
private school segregation. 3
[T]here is evidence of a linkage between desegregation and private school growth
in Florida. At the start of school in Fall, 1971, fifty-eight new private schools
opened their doors, all in areas where desegregation was an issue. From 1969-
1973, the period of Florida's most significant advances in desegregation, total
private school enrollment was estimated to have increased approximately 16
percent. By contrast, total public school enrollments increased 8.6 percent over
the same period. (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 5, 7.
78. The court in Coffey v. State Educ. Finance Comm'n, 296 F. Supp. 1389 (S.D.
Miss. 1969) defined "segregation academy" as a private school "operated on a racially
segregated basis as an alternative available to white students seeking to avoid deseg-
regated public schools." Id. at 1392.
79. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973). Plaintiffs charged, and the
defendants conceded, that:
Private schools in Mississippi have experienced a marked growth in recent
years. As recently as the 1963-1964 school year, there were only 17 private
schools other -than Catholic schools; the total enrollment was 2,362 students. In
these non-public schools 916 students were Negro, and 192 of these were en-
rolled in special schools for retarded, orphaned, or abandoned children. By
September 1970, the number of private non-Catholic schools had increased to
155 with a student population estimated at 42,000, virtually all white ...
"[The creation and enlargement of these [private] academies occurred simulta-
neously with major events in the desegregation of public schools ... "
Id. at 457 (quoting Brief for Appellants at 8-9).
80. See Note, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the
Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 449,
460-61 (1974).
81. See sources cited in note 72 supra.
82. See Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, supra note 72, at 1452.
83. The Court could have left the problem to individual states, many of which have
prohibited discrimination in at least some private schools. No southern states, however,
[Vol. 1978:211
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One possibility was to bring private schools under fourteenth amend-
ment restrictions by finding the states were substantially involved with
the schools. Indeed, when states provided these schools with tuition
grants,' free textbooks,8 5 exclusive use of recreational facilities, 86 or
other benefits, 87 courts held the state action in segregated academies
violated the equal protection clause and enjoined further state support.
No court brought the private schools under state-wide desegregation
orders after finding state action.A8 A broader state action doctrine, how-
ever, would have enabled the court to fashion such a remedy. State
officials, for example, who acquiesced in the deterioration of the public
school system to the extent that segregated private schools offered the
only viable educational system, arguably circumvented their constitu-
tional obligation to maintain a unitary school system.8 9 A suitable remedy
for the inferred complicity between state officials and private schools
would have been to require the private schools to desegregate or close;
this would have forced the state officials to provide the Brown mandated
unitary public school system.
Alternatively, the Court could have held that segregated academies
perform a public function by offering a basic and important service to the
have done so. See Dorsen, Racial Discrimination in "Private" Schools, 9 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 39,47 (1967); Fox, Discrimination and Antidiscrimination in Massachusetts Law,
44 B.U.L. REV. 30, 64 (1964). See generally Note, Fair Educational Practices Acts: A
Solution to Discrimination?, 64 HARv. L. REV. 307 (1950).
84. Poindexter v. Louisiana Financial Assistance Comm'n, 275 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.
La. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 571 (1968).
85. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
86. Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974).
87. Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404
U.S. 997 (1971) (federal tax exemptions to segregated private schools); United States v.
Tunica County School Dist., 323 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Miss. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 440
F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1971) (payment of salaries to teachers refusing reassignment pursuant to
school desegregation plan); see Note, Post-Brown Private White Schools-An Imperfect
Dualism, supra note 72.
88. See Lee v. Macon County Bd. of Educ., 267 F. Supp. 458, 478 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd
sub nom. Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215 (1967). See generally Yackle, supra note
31, at 487-507; Note, Segregation Academies and State Action, supra note 72, at 1450-60.
89. See Griffin v. School Bd. of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 230-31 (1964)
(while noting the fact of state subsidy, the Court stressed the unconstitutional motivation
of the county in abandoning its public schools). These officials arguably encouraged
discrimination, in violation of the equal protection clause, by effectively delegating their
responsibility to provide education to private persons known to discriminate. Cf. Reitman
v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (Justice Douglas pointed out that by enacting Proposition
14, the state effectively delegated its zoning authority to private persons who dis-
criminated on the basis of race). See generally Yackle, supra note 31.
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community which the state is typically expected to perform. 9 Under the
public function doctrine, which focuses on the nature of the activity
rather than the extent of the state's involvement with the acting entity, a
private entity that exercises governmental functions is considered an
instrument of the state subject to fourteenth amendment restrictions. 91
Segregated academies, thriving in the midst of a declining public school
system, arguably perform a public function. 92 Despite its apparent logic,
however, the Court has not adopted this expansion of the public function
doctrine. 93
In light of the Burger Court's approach to the fourteenth amendment-
narrowing its scope, 94 requiring proof of official purposeful discrimina-
tory acts, 95 and tailoring the remedy to correct only segregative results
specifically attributable to the violation9 6 -it would have been wholly
inconsistent for the Court to embrace a state action or public function
definition that would bring private schools under the equal protection
clause. In Runyon v. McCrary97 the Court was confronted with the
problem of how to remain faithful to Brown and the national commit-
90. See Note, supra note 29, at 1151-52.
91. Cases finding that a private entity performed a public function include: Evans v.
Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (maintenance of park); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953)
(primary elections held by private political club); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)
(first amendment rights in a company town).
92. See Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La.),
vacated on procedural grounds, 207 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 306 F.2d 489 (5th Cir.
1962). Judge J. Skelly Wright concluded:
[O]ne may question whether any school. . . can ever be so 'private' as to escape
the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . No one any longer doubts that
education is a matter affected with the greatest public interest. And this is true
whether it is offered by a public or private institution. . . . Clearly, the adminis-
trators of a private college are performing a public function. They do the work of
the state, often in the place of the state. . . . [A]re they not then. . . subject to
the constitutional restraints on governmental action ....
203 F. Supp. at 858-59.
93. See Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
The court rejected the argument "that Columbia [University] performs a 'public function'
in 'educating persons' which may be likened to a 'company town' or a party primary
system," noting that "[iff the law were what plaintiffs declare it to be, the difficult
problem of aid to 'private schools'W-specifically, parochial schools-would not exist
... . Indeed the very idea of a parochial school would be unthinkable." Id. at 549 &
n.19.
94. See notes 39-43 supra and accompanying, text.
95. See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
96. See Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990, 991 (1976)
(vacating and remanding) (Powell, J., concurring); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spang-
ler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976). See note 98 infra.
97. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss1/11
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ment to desegregation, which required an end to segregated private
schools, without expanding the fourteenth amendment to prohibit racial
discrimination in private action. 98
IV. THE SOLUTION
The Jones rule99 was applied in two subsequent cases in which mem-
bership in community recreation associations was denied to blacks who
owned or leased homes in the area served by the recreational facilities.
The Court's decisions indicated that section 1982 would be broadly
interpreted. In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc. ,100 a private recrea-
tional facility, organized for the benefit of owners and lessees of property
in a prescribed area, refused to approve a white member's transfer of his
assignable share in the park to his black lessee. The Court held that the
racially motivated refusal deprived the black lessee of his "same right"
to lease property protected by section 1982.1"1
In 1973, a unanimous Court in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recrea-
tional Association10 2 granted relief under section 1982 to a black
98. The problem was compelling for other reasons. Absent a solution, the increasing
number of and enrollment in private schools threatened the Court's policy of narrowly
tailoring desegregation orders to correct the specific effects of a constitutional violation
and of employing limited busing plans. See. e.g., Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler,
427 U.S. 424 (1976); Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990,
991 (1976) (vacating and remanding). Justice Powell, concurring in Austin, stated that
unless the evidence indicated that 'absent those constitutional violations, the Austin
School System would have been integrated to the extent contemplated by the plan," the
sweeping busing plan was overbroad. Id. at 994. He noted that in light of the significant
interests involved, only the narrowest desegregation order that could remedy the violation
was required:
A related equitable principle, also applicable in fashioning a desegregation
remedy, is that a court has the duty to 'balanc[e] ... the individual and
collective interests.' Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S., at 738. The individual inter-
ests at issue here are as personal and important as any in our society. They relate
to the family, and to the concern of parents for the welfare and education of their
children-especially those of tender age. Families share these interests wholly
without regard to race, ethnic origin, or economic status. It also is to be remem-
bered, in granting equitable relief, that a desegregation decree is unique in that its
burden falls not upon the officials or private interests responsible for the offend-
ing action but, rather, upon innocent children and parents.
Id. at 995 n.7.
99. See notes 8-14 supra and accompanying text.
100. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
101. Id. at 234-37. The Court said that assignment of a membership share in the park
was incidental to the leasehold interest that the tenant purchased from the lessor. The
tenant, however, did not possess a leasehold interest in the park; rather, under the park's
bylaws, he possessed only a contingent claim to the lessor's membership share assignable
to lessees and subject to approval by the park's board of directors.
102. 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
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homeowner denied use of the community pool due to his race. Because
the opportunity to use the pool was an attractive feature of home own-
ership in that area, the Court reasoned that the pool association's refusal
to admit black members abridged the plaintiff's right to own a home in
that area.103 Finding that the recreational associations in Sullivan and
Tillman had no defined membership selection criteria, the Court held
that they did not constitute private social organizations within the private
club exception of Title VII. 10 4 It therefore declined to decide whether
section 1982 was subject to a private club limitation. 10 5
In addition to discriminating against blacks in property transactions,
the Wheaton-Haven Association had a racially discriminatory guest poli-
cy which plaintiffs claimed infringed their section 1981 "same right to
contract." 10 The Court agreed, noting the "historical interrelationship"
between sections 1981 and 1982, and could discern no reason to construe
them differently. 107 In 1975, the Court held in Johnson v. Railway Ex-
press Agency, Inc.108 that section 1981, like section 1982, extended to
private conduct.' °9
The Court, having read section 1982 literally in Jones,11° having
applied it to highly speculative "property" interests in Sullivan and
Tillman, 111 and having held in Johnson that sections 1981 and 1982 must
103. Id. at 437. The Court extended the notion that rights incidental to property
ownership are themselves property interests protected by § 1982. Under Wheaton-Ha-
ven's bylaws, as in Little Hunting Park, residents in the geographical preference area did
not have to be endorsed by current members and received preferential standing on the
waiting list if membership were full. In addition, a resident-member could confer a first
option on the purchaser of his home. All applicants, however, still had to be approved by
Wheaton-Haven's board of directors. Id. at 438-39.
104. See note 25 supra. In Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 301-02 (1969), the Court held
that a club must possess 1) a nonbusiness character, 2) membership control
over its finances and governance, and 3) genuine selectivity over admissions in order to fit
within the "private club" exemption and thus be permitted to discriminate under Title II.
105. 410 U.S. at 438-40; 396 U.S. at 236-37. See Sims v. Order of United Commercial
Travelers of America, 343 F. Supp. 112, 114 (D. Mass. 1972). The court suggested that a
private club limitation would necessarily apply to §§ 1981 and 1982 because if the ben-
efit denied is an incident of membership in a club, refusal to confer that benefit does
not constitute a refusal to sell or contract, protected by the statutes. It is rather a refusal to
admit to membership, not guaranteed by their language or spirit.
106. 410 U.S. at 433, 440.
107. Id. at 440.
108. 421 U.S. 454 (1975). See notes 52-60 supra and accompanying text.
109. 421 U.S. at 459-60. "Although this Court has not specifically so held, it is well
settled among the Federal Courts of Appeals-and we now join them-that § 1981 affords
a federal remedy against discrimination in private employment on the basis of race." Id.
110. 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See notes 8-14 supra and accompanying text.
111. See notes 103-07 supra and accompanying text.
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be construed similarly,112 confronted the problem of segregated private
schools in Runyon v. McCrary. I3 Justice Stewart, writing for a divided
Court, 14 held that on the basis of Jones, section 1981 prohibited racially
discriminatory admissions procedures in commercially operated, non-
sectarian private schools. 1 5
In McCrary,116 the parents of black children learned about the private
schools from the classified telephone directory and direct-mail advertise-
ments addressed to "Resident." Upon inquiring about admission, they
were informed that only white children were accepted.1 17 The Court
found that the private schools advertised their services to the general
public and had no admissions criteria except race." 8 They essentially
112. See notes 52-60, 108-09 supra and accompanying text.
113. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). See generally Hirschoff, Runyon v. McCrary and Regulation
of Private Schools, 52 IND. L. REV. 747 (1977); Note, Section 1981 and Discrimination in
Private Schools, 1976 DUKE L.J. 25 [hereinafter cited as Discrimination]; Note, supra
note 59; Note, Civil Rights-Race Discrimination-Section 1981 Applicable to Private
School Admissions, 25 KAN. L. REV. 247 (1977); Note, Discriminatory Admissions
Policies and Federal Statutory Control of Contractual Relationships: McCrary v. Runyon,
28 ME. L. REv. 269 (1976); Comment, Private School Desegregation Under Section 1981,
124 U. PA. L. REV. 714 (1976); 25 EMORY L.J. 209 (1976); 7 U. TOL. L. REv. 139 (1975).
114. Justice Stewart also authored the majority opinion in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). See notes 8-19 supra and accompanying text. The Chief Justice
and Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall joined Justice Stewart's majority opinion;
Justices Powell and Stevens concurred separately; and Justice Rehnquist joined Justice
White in dissent.
115. 427 U.S. at 168-75. The district court held that § 1981 prohibited racial dis-
crimination in contracting for admission to a private school, but the state's statute of
limitations barred the plaintiffs' claim for damages. Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School,
Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973). On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the award
of attorney's fees but affirmed the rest of the decision. McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082
(4th Cir. 1975).
116. McCrary is a combination of two cases with similar fact patterns. The parents of
Colon Gonzales applied at Fairfax-Brewster School after receiving an advertisement in
the mail and hearing of the school from a friend whose son attended there. After the
application was returned, Mr. Gonzales inquired about the rejection and was informed
that the school was not integrated. Both the Gonzaleses and Mrs. McCrary telephoned
Bobbe's School about enrolling their sons and were informed that only members of the
Caucasian race were accepted. The Southern Independent School Association represent-
ing more than 300 private, nonprofit schools in the South, some of which it concedes are
racially discriminatory, intervened in both actions. The Association claimed that such
discrimination was not prohibited by § 1981 and could not be constitutionally prevented.
Id. at 164-65.
117. Id. at 165.
118. Id. at 172-73 & n.10. The significance of McCrary depends on the amount and
kind of proof required to establish a § 1981 violation in private contracting. The
Court did not discuss this issue. Rather, it accepted the trial court's finding that the
children were refused admission solely on the basis of race. Id. at 173. The implications of
the proof required in McCrary are examined at notes 180-97 infra and accompanying text.Washington University Open Scholarship
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offered the public a right to enter into a commercial contract whereby the
school would provide educational services in return for a fee. 119 By
prohibiting racial discrimination in the making of that contract, Justice
Stewart reasoned, the Court was simply holding that " 'a dollar in the
hands of a Negro will purchase the same thing as a dollar in the hands of
a white man.' "120
The Court noted that Jones conclusively established that section 1 of
the 1866 Civil Rights Act, from which both sections 1981 and 1982 were
derived,' 2 ' prohibited all racial discrimination with respect to the rights
enumerated therein. Therefore, just as section 1982 outlawed discrimina-
tion in the sale or lease of private property, section 1981 prohibited
discrimination in private contracting. 122 Furthermore, section 1981 as
applied to discrimination in contracting for admission to private schools
was constitutional under the thirteenth amendment. Congress could ra-
tionally have concluded, the Court held, that discrimination in education-
al contracting was as much a "badge of slavery" as discrimination in
employment or in the purchase or lease of property; and, empowered by
section 2 of the thirteenth amendment, it could legitimately have
enacted a statute to forbid it.123
119. Id. at 172-73. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 23.
120. 427 U.S. at 179 (quoting Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,443 (1968)).
The dissent in the Court of Appeals and the petitioners in this action distinguished
McCrary from Jones on two bases: first, the right to attend a private school involved a
status relationship between pupil and teacher and only incidentally a contract; secondly,
whereas the mere freedom from legal disabilities would be meaningless if a person could
refuse to sell another property because of his race, freedom from legal disabilities in
education was not meaningless because it required the state to provide equal public
educational opportunities for all. See McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1083, 1093-94 (4th Cir.
1975); Brief for Petitioners Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) at 6-8, Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae, Id., at 10 n.10, 19-20.
121. The Court in Jones overruled Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906) which
had interpreted § 1981 narrowly, and in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421
U.S. 454, 459-60,470-71 (1975), unanimously confirmed that §§ 1981 and 1982 were "sister
provisions" derived from § 1 of the 1866 Act and must be interpreted together. See notes
15-59 & 99-112 supra and accompanying text.
122. 427 U.S. at 173-75.
123. Id. at 179. See Brief for Respondents at 21:
It has been suggested by more than one commentator that, in light of Jones v.
Mayer Co., it is necessary to view the principal of freedom established by the
Thirteenth Amendment as one of those "[gireat concepts. . . purposely left to
gather meaning from experience." . . . The relics of slavery survive today in
more forms than the Reconstruction Congress could have anticipated, and there
is no reason why Section 1981 should be limited in application merely because
Congressional spokesmen at that time did not foresee all the possible forms of
contract to which the section might be applicable. Accordingly, decisional law to
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The Court implied that section 1981 was limited by two factors. First,
the Court emphasized that the private schools in McCrary, like the
recreational associations in Sullivan and Tillman, openly appealed to all
parents of children within the geographic area and were private only in
that they received no state aid and were privately managed.124 In so
doing, the Court may have grafted a private club exception onto section
1981.125 Secondly, the Court restricted section 1981 and the thirteenth
amendment to racial discrimination claims and noted that it might have
reached a different result if the school excluded applicants on the basis of
sex or religion. 126
Relying primarily on Jones and emphasizing the limitations of the
Court's holding, Justice Powell reluctantly concurred. 12 7 He reasoned
that the majority's decision did not require courts to investigate a private
party's motives whenever he refused to contract with another person
because some contracts were simply too personal to be included within
section 1981.128 Thus, when an individual personally chose his bargain-
ing partners, Powell asserted, the choice reflected "a purpose of exclu-
See generally Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom Revisited: Some First
Thoughts on Jones v. Mayer Co., 22 RUTGERS L. REV. 537 (1968); Note, The "New"
Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, supra note 23.
124. 427 U.S. at 172-73.
125. Id. at 172 n. 10. See note 25 supra; Note, Segregated Academies, Section 1981,
and an Exemption for Truly Private Groups: McCrary v. Runyon, 8 CONN. L. REV. 571
(1976).
126. 427 U.S. at 167-68. In fact, the Court noted that a different question would be
presented by a private sectarian school that engaged in racial discrimination on religious
grounds. Id. at 167. See United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1977);
Kermit v. Banco Credito y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d I (Ist Cir. 1976). The use of § 1981
by a lower court in a sex discrimination case, Parmer v. National Cash Register Co., 346
F. Supp. 1043, 1047 (S.D. Ohio 1972), has apparently been overruled by McCrary.
The Fifth Circuit, in Brown v. Dade Christian Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 310 (5th Cir.
1977), considered the scope of the religious exception left open in McCrary and narrowly
construed it. In a forceful concurring opinion, Justice Goldberg contended that society's
interest in desegregation outweighed its first amendment interest in religious freedom. Id.
at 314. See 53 NOTRE DAME LAW. 107 (1977).
127. 427 U.S. at 186.
128. Id. at 187. A close reading of Justice Powell's concurring opinion suggests that
§ 1981 is applicable only to private contracts that are essentially public even though they
involve no real state action. He explained:
But choices, including those involved in entering into a contract, that are "pri-
vate" in the sense that they are not part of a commercial relationship offered
generally or widely, and that reflect the selectivity exercised by an individual
entering into a personal relationship, certainly were never intended to be restrict-
ed by the 19th century Civil Rights Acts. The open offer to the public generally
involved in the case before us is simply not a "private" contract in this sense.
Id. at 189.Washington University Open Scholarship
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siveness" made on subjective factors other than race. In such cases, the
offeree's privacy and associational rights must be respected.' 2 9
Justice Stevens, in a separate concurring opinion,t 30 concluded that the
Jones Court had erroneously interpreted section 1982 and the 1866 Civil
Rights Act to apply to private conduct; this interpretation, however,
controlled that of section 1981. The real issue, therefore, was whether
Jones and its progeny should be overruled. 131 He concluded that although
Jones incorrectly interpreted congressional intent in 1866, it accurately
reflected the "mores of today" and he therefore concurred. 132
In dissent, Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, 33 maintained
that the Jones Court's interpretation of section 1982 was not applicable to
section 1981. Justice White argued that the Court misinterpreted its
holding in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.,134 and had not
previously considered the legislative history of section 1981.135 Johnson,
129. "A small kindergarten or music class, operated on the basis of personal invita-
tions extended to a limited number of pre-identified students, for example, would present
a far different case." Id. at 188.
130. Id. at 189.
131. Id. at 190.
132. Id. at 191-92.
Such reasoning is subject to criticism: First, should the Supreme Court decide im-
portant questions of constitutional law on the basis of incorrect judicial precedent simply
because they believe that the result accords with society's current value system? Second-
ly, in view of recent congressional, executive, and judicial statements about freedom of
association, privacy, and parental liberty rights to educate their children according to their
values, it is debatable whether the overruling of Jones, or the opposite result in McCrary
"would be so clearly contrary . . . to . . .the mores of today that . . . the Court is
entirely correct in adhering to Jones." Id. at 191-92.
It is highly unlikely, given the popular mood in regard to the desegregation of public
schools, that Congress would enact and the President sign a law prohibiting racial dis-
crimination in private schools. See Wash. Post, June 7, 1976, at 1, col. 6 (quoting President
Ford's deputy press secretary's clarification of Ford's response to a question concerning
the right of parents to send their children to segregated private schools):
"I think he clearly meant that a private school that does not accept federal
funds or benefit from federal tax breaks should have the right to accept or reject
students as it sees fit. That is his belief."
Carlson added that Mr. Ford also supports the right of parents to send their
children to the school of their choice.
Some members of the Court appear to be increasingly concerned over desegregation
orders that infringe constitutionally protected parental rights. See Austin Independent
School Dist. v. United States, 429 U.S. 990, 994 n.7 (1976) (Powell J., concurring).
133. 427 U.S. at 192.
134. 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
135. The majority and two concurring Justices assert that this Court has already
considered the issue in this litigation and resolved it in favor of a right of action
for private racially motivated refusals to contract. They are wrong. . . . [T]he
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he contended, was really a Title VII employment discrimination case in
which the Court simply noted that section 1981 also prohibited racial
discrimination in private employment contracting. The section 1981
question, however, was neither raised nor briefed by the parties and,
White argued, the Court's statement was merely dictum.
136
Upon thoughtful consideration, White continued, the Court could hold
that section 1981, unlike section 1982, was based on the 1870 Voting
Rights Act 137 and the fourteenth amendment. 138 His argument was three-
pronged: First, the 1866 statute applies to "citizens of every race and
color,' 139 whereas section 1981, like the 1870 Act, applies to "all
persons.""' Secondly, unlike the 1866 Act, section 1981 and the 1870
Act protect against "taxes, licenses and exactions of every kind." '41 And
finally, "the Revisers' notes to the 1874 Revisions-which notes were
before Congress when it enacted the Revised Statutes into positive law-
clearly designate section 16 of the Voting Rights Act of 1870 as the
source for § 1977-the current 42 U.S.C. § 1981."142
Section 1981, constitutionally based on the fourteenth amendment,
confers on all people the "same right" to contract "as is enjoyed by
white citizens."1 143 Because white citizens have no right to make
contracts with unwilling second parties, the statute confers no such right
on blacks. Rather, the statute guarantees to all people the same right to
enter into contracts freely "with other willing parties and to 'enforce'
only time the issue has been previously addressed by this Court it was addressed
in [Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc.] in which the Court had issued a
limited grant of certiorari, not including the issue involved here; in which the
issue involved here was irrelevant to the decision; and in which the parties had
not briefed the issue and the Court had not canvassed the relevant legislative
history.
427 U.S. at 192 n. 1. This is perhaps the weakest part of White's dissent.
136. Id. at 213-14.
137. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144.
138. Id. at 195 n.6.
139. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 &
1982 (1970) (emphasis added). See text quoted in note 3 supra.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). See text quoted in note 3 supra. Act of May 31, 1870, ch.
114, § 16, 16 Stat. 144, provides in pertinent part:
That all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States have the same right
in every State and Territory in the United States to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of person and property as is enjoyed by white
citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses,
and exactions of every kind, and none other. ...
141. See text quoted in notes 3 & 140 supra.
142. 427 U.S. at 195 n.6.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
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those contracts in court."144 Section 1981 also prohibits state statutes or
court rules limiting this right for blacks. 145 To construe the 1866 Act and
section 1981 as the majority had, White reasoned, unreasonably attribu-
ted to Congress an intent to define as "badges of slavery" racially
motivated refusals to contract and to proscribe them in the exercise of
their thirteenth amendment power. 146
The dissent warned that the Court's decision in McCrary coupled with
its decision in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co. ,147
holding that section 1981 provided a cause of action to whites as well
as blacks for racially motivated refusals to contract, 141 "threatens to
embark the Judiciary on a treacherous course." 149 White predicted that
fanciful definitions of "contract" would emerge in the future as the
Court juggled the sensitive rights of association, privacy, and liberty with
the new right and concluded that this task, involving delicate policy
considerations, was legislative rather than judicial. 150
144. 427 U.S. at 204-05.
145. Id. at 194.
146. Id. at 211. There is nothing in the language of the statute to distinguish, as the
majority and concurring opinions attempted to do, between the right to contract to attend
a private school, to hire a babysitter, or to join a private association. If the language
"meant exactly what it said" in one situation, Justice White pointed out, it must mean the
same thing in all situations.
147. 427 U.S. 273 (1976). Two white employees of a transportation company were
discharged for misappropriating cargo from a company shipment but a black employee
similarly charged was retained. The white employees brought an action charging a viola-
tion of Title VII and § 1981. Held: § 1981 and Title VII prohibit racial discrimination in
private employment against white as well as nonwhite persons.
148. 427 U.S. at 296. Prior to McDonald, the lower courts had split on the issue of
whether whites could bring a claim of racial discrimination in employment under §
1981. Compare Bale v. United Steelworkers, 6 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8948 (W.D. Pa. 1973),
Van Hoomissen v. Xerox Corp., 368 F. Supp. 829 (N.D. Cal. 1973), and Ripp v. Dobbs
Houses, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 205 (N.D. Ala. 1973) (§ 1981 limited to blacks), with Hol-
lander v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 392 F. Supp. 90 (D. Conn. 1975), WRMA Broadcast-
ing Co. v. Hawthorne, 365 F. Supp. 577 (M.D. Ala. 1973), and Central Presbyterian
Church v. Black Liberation Front, 303 F. Supp. 894 (E.D. Mo. 1969) (whites can bring an
action under § 1981).
149. 427 U.S. at 212. The decision in McDonald was clearly wrong and provided
conclusive proof for Justice White that § 1981 guaranteed to all persons only equal
rights under the law (guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment) to engage in and enforce
contracts. To hold otherwise, as the Court did in McCrary and McDonald, White argued,
leads to the anomolous and inconceivable result that Congress in the 1866 Civil Rights Act
provided a cause of action to a former slave owner "against his former slave if the former
slave refused to work for him on the ground that he was a white man." Id. at 211.
150. Id. at 212. Several law review writers have engaged in such "fanciful" definitions
of "contract." See Discrimination, supra note 113, at 149-53; Note, supra note 58, at 423-
29; Comment, supra note 116, at 746-48; Note, Runyon v. McCrary: Section 1981 Opens
the Door of Discriminatory Private Schools, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 179,200-03 (1977).
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V. COMPETING INTERESTS
The McCrary Court recognized that its decision impinged the
constitutionally protected rights of association, privacy, and liberty. 5'
After balancing these rights against the right to be free from racial
discrimination in admission to private schools, the Court held that the
thirteenth amendment limits the exercise of these constitutionally protect-
ed rights. 152
A. Freedom of Association
The Court explicitly recognized the first amendment right of freedom
of association in NAACP v. Alabama.'53 The right clearly protects
association for the purpose of expressing beliefs and ideas," and Justice
Douglas indicated that "membership in a group,"' 55 or "joining" a
group is a form of expression. 156 The Court has also recognized that the
freedom to associate can include the freedom to exclude. 7 By attending
151. 427 U.S. at 175-79.
152. Id. at 178-79. See Note, supra note 59, at 438-40.
153. 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (forced disclosure of NAACP's membership list would uncon-
stitutionally interfere with the group's ability to advance its beliefs). Although NAACP
protected the individual's associational right to express political ideas, the right extends to
the expression of social ideas as well. See Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556
(1974); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407
U.S. 163 (1972). See generally Douglas, The Right of Association, 63 COLUM. L. REV.
1361 (1963); Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J.
1 (1964); Nathanson, Freedom of Association and the QuestforInternal Security: Conspir-
acy from Dennis to Dr. Spock, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 153 (1970); Comment, Discrimination in
Private Social Clubs: Freedom of Association and the Right to Privacy, 1970 DUKE L.J.
1181; Note, Freedom of Association: Constitutional Right or Judicial Technique?, 46 VA.
L. REV. 730 (1960); Note, Runyon v. McCrary: Section 1981 Opens the Door of Dis-
criminatory Private Schools, supra note 150.
154. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
155. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The right of association "includes
the right to express one's attitudes or philosophies by membership in a group." Id. at 483.
156. Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961) (dissenting opinion). "Joining is one
method of expression." Id. at 882.
157. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (Douglas, J., joined by
Marshall, J., dissenting):
My view of the First Amendment and the related guarantees of the Bill of Rights
is that they create a zone of privacy which precludes government from interfer-
ing with private clubs or groups. . . . Government may not tell a man or woman
who his or her associates must be. The individual can be as selective as he
desires.
Id. at 179-80.
In Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973), referring to discrimination by private
schools receiving state aid, the Court concluded: "Such private bias is not barred by the
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a segregated school a student is, arguably, expressing his view that the
Caucasian race is superior and that he desires racial separation.158
The right to associate, however, is not absolute; rather, it must be
balanced against competing interests. In the case of private segregated
schools, the Court must weigh society's interest in protecting its citizens'
thirteenth amendment right to be free from racial discrimination against
society's interest in preserving its citizens' first amendment associational
rights. 159 When society's interest in nondiscrimination predominates, the
Court held in Norwood v. Harrison,"6 Congress can act under its
thirteenth amendment enforcement power to remedy the private discrimi-
nation. 161
The McCrary Court disingenuously held that the right to associate for
the purpose of expressing a belief in racial segregation was unaffected by
its ruling because "there is no showing that discontinuance of dis-
criminatory admission practices would inhibit in any way the teaching in
these schools of any [segregationist] ideas or dogma." 162 It is difficult to
conceive of an act that would have a greater chilling effect on such
teaching. Indeed, the Court had noted in Norwood that discriminatory
Constitution, nor does it invoke any sanction of laws, but neither can it call on the
Constitution for material aid from the State." Id. at 469.
In Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964), Justice Goldberg concurred, stating:
Prejudice and bigotry in any form are regrettable, but it is the constitutional right
of every person to close his home or club to any person or to choose his social
intimates and business partners solely on the basis of personal prejudices includ-
ing race. These and other rights pertaining to privacy and private association are
themselves constitutionally protected liberties.
Id. at 313.
158. See Brief for Petitioner, Southern Independent School Ass'n, Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. at 23-27. Alternatively, whether a group of people can exclude others
from their association for any reason is a right of non-association protected by the right of
privacy, and not a first amendment issue. See Emerson, supra note 153.
Assuming arguendo that a student has a constitutional right to choose which school
he will attend, as Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 298 (1966), seems to hold, some contend
that a problem exists because the child is not actually making an informed choice about
which school to attend in the exercise of his associational rights. Rather, the right at stake
is the parents' liberty to ensure that their children receive a racially segregated education.
See Comment, supra note 153; Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups, supra note 72.
159. Compare Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 98 (1945) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) ("insistence by individuals on their private prejudices. . . ought not to have
a higher constitutional sanction than the determination of a State to extend the area of
nondiscrimination"), with Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 179-80 (Douglas,
J., dissenting) ("The associational rights which our system honors permit all white, all
black, all brown, and all yellow clubs to be formed.").
160. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
161. Id. at 470.
162. Id. (quoting McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1087 (4th Cir. 1975)).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss1/11
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admission procedures exert "a pervasive influence on the entire educa-
tional process." 63 And in NAACP v. Alabama,164 the Court had stated,
in a slightly different context, that "privacy in group association may in
many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of
association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs."' ' 65
Although the Court in McCrary initially stated that associational rights
of students attending private segregated academies were not infringed by
its decision, it later acknowledged that they were and relied on its
reasoning in Norwood to justify its conclusion: "[Although] the
Constitution [does not proscribe private bias, it] places no value on
discrimination . . . . [i]nvidious private discrimination may be charac-
terized as a form of exercising freedom of association protected by the
First Amendment . . . it has never been accorded affirmative constitu-
tional protections.""6 Furthermore, some private discrimination was
"subject to special remedial legislation. . . under § 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment "'. ... " Relying on this language, the McCrary Court
effectively held that private school segregation, even if it were a form of
freedom of association, had been legitimately proscribed by Congress
under its thirteenth amendment power. 1 68 By upholding section 1981 as a
valid exercise of Congress' power, the Court apparently held that one
may associate and exclude to promote a belief, except on the basis of
race.
B. The Right to Privacy
The Supreme Court has recognized a right to freedom from govern-
mental interference in matters relating to the family, procreation, and the
home. 16 9 But this privacy right has been narrowly defined by the
163. 413 U.S. at 469. See notes 160-61 supra and accompanying text.
164. 357 U.S. 449. See note 153 supra.
165. 357 U.S. at 462.
166. 427 U.S. at 176 (quoting Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. at 469-70).
167. Id. See Comment, supra note 113 (courts must balance rights of privacy and
association against thirteenth amendment interest). But see Discrimination, supra note
113 (rights of association and privacy not implicated in § 1981 actions).
168. See Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups, supra note 72.
169. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431U.S. 678 (1977) (absolute prohibition on
distribution of contraceptives to minors invalid); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U S. 52 (1976) (parent has no absolute veto over minor's decision to obtain an abortion);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to obtain an abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972) (right of unmarried couples to obtain contraceptives); Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969) (right to possess obscene material in the home); Griswold v. Connec-
ticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of married couple to use contraceptives). See generally
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courts.170 In McCrary, although the Court acknowledged the existence of
a right to privacy and affirmed the parental right to decide whether to
bear a child and determine how that child would be educated, it held that
the parental decision regarding a child's education was subject to "rea-
sonable" governmental restrictions.1 71 Prior to this case, however, the
Court had not intimated that the states or the federal government could
dictate the reasonable admission procedure of private schools. 172 By
holding in McCrary that section 1981 was a reasonable restriction, the
Court indicated that the thirteenth amendment right to be free from racial
discrimination limits the parental privacy right.
C. Liberty Interest of Parents to Direct Their Children's Education
A parent who asserts an associational and privacy right to enroll his
child in a segregated private school is claiming these rights on behalf of
his child as well as himself. Yet the child may not share his parents'
preferences. 173 The fourteenth amendment liberty right of parents to
direct the education of their children, therefore, may provide a stronger
argument against government prohibition of racially segregated private
schools. 174 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,175 the Supreme Court struck
Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410 (1974); Warren & Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); Symposium-Pivacy, 31 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 251 (1966); Note, On Privacy: Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48
N.Y.U.L. REV. 670 (1973).
170. See Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977);
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
See also 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 337.
The majority in McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975), held that the right
to privacy applied only in "certain instances when . . . a few people are involved in
activity unintended for the public view [and in which] it is more than likely or inevitable
that there is some plan or purpose of exclusiveness other than race." Id. at 1088. See
generally Note, supra note 169.
171. 427 U.S. at 178. See Brief for Petitioners at 12: "The right of parents to rear and
educate their children [is] subject, of course, to reasonable regulation to promote health,
safety, and the general welfare."
172. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
173. Id. at 517 ("Young children do not discriminate against each other; that is a
characteristic of maturity.").
174. The Court defined the parents' liberty interest in directing their children's educa-
tion in Pierce:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union
repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by
forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the
mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations.
Id. at 535.https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss1/11
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down an Oregon statute requiring all parents to enroll their children in
public schools, and in Meyer v. Nebraska,176 the Court invalidated a
statute prohibiting the teaching of a foreign language to students below
the ninth grade in public and private schools. Although these cases
acknowledge a parent's right to send his child to a private school, they
recognize that such schools are subject to "reasonable" state regula-
tion. 177
The McCrary Court held that the right to be free from racially
discriminatory admissions to private schools, guaranteed by the thir-
teenth amendment and section 1981, was a reasonable restriction because'
it threatened neither the private schools' existence nor the content of
classroom instruction.' The Court balanced the competing thirteenth
and fourteenth amendment interests and in effect held that although a
parent could send his child to a school that advocated segregation, he had
no constitutionally protected right to send him to a segregated school.
VI. THE SIGNIFICANCE
A. Possible Limitations: The Proof Required to Establish a Section
1981 Violation
The Court's holding in McCrary that section 1981 prohibits racially
Other liberty interests protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment include the right of extended families to live together (Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977)), the right to choose whether to bear and how to rear
children (Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645
(1972)), and the right to personal choice in the decision of whether to marry (Zablocki v.
Redhail, 98 S. Ct. 673 (1978)).
175. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
176. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
177. For example, state regulations establish the minimum entrance age for school,
minimum number of years a child must attend, and the subject matter that must be taught.
When the parental right concerns the religious as well as educational instruction of their
children, however, the Court has indicated a willingness to weigh the parental due process
right more heavily and uphold fewer "reasonable" governmental restrictions. See Wis-
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968); Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
[The Pierce Court recognized] the power of the State reasonably to regulate all
schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to
require that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers shall be
of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly
essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is
manifestly inimical to the public welfare.
268 U.S. at 534. Pierce did not seem to confer on the states any power to dictate admission
practices of particular private schools.
178. 427 U.S. at 178.
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discriminatory admissions procedures in private schools and is a valid
exercise of Congress' thirteenth amendment enforcement power, may
enable the Court to order broad remedial desegregation programs and
uphold new affirmative action legislation. Whether this potential is
realized depends largely on the kind and amount of proof required to
establish a section 1981 violation. 179
Although proof of discrimination is necessary to establish a thirteenth
or fourteenth amendment violation, the Court has recently required
plaintiffs to prove an intent or purpose to discriminate in fourteenth
amendment cases and has refused to infer intent from statistical evidence
of racially disproportionate impact.180 In section 1981 employment dis-
crimination cases, however, the Court has held that the less stringent
Title VII test, articulated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. ,181 applies. Statis-
tical evidence that a hiring test or practice resulted in a disproportionate
racial impact raises a prima facie case of discrimination; 8 2 the burden
then shifts to the employer to demonstrate a business necessity for the
policy and a direct relationship between the test or practice and job
performance. 183 This burden is difficult to sustain and the employer,
found guilty of racial discrimination, is subject to remedial court or-
ders. 184
In 1976, however, the Court discussed the Title VII test in Washington
v. Davis 85 and hinted that it might narrow the gap between the proof
required for an action derived from the thirteenth and fourteenth amend-
ments. This would limit the impact of McCrary. 86 Washington substan-
tially reduced the employer's burden established in Griggs by ruling that
179. See note 118 supra.
180. See cases cited in note 44 supra.
181. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
182. See notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text.
183. See notes 45-50 supra and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.14 (1973);
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971); Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976,
981-82 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil Serv. Comm'n, 481
F.2d 1333, 1337 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1975); Payne v. Travenol
Laboratories, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 248, 255-60 (N.D. Miss. 1976).
185. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
186. Because lower courts have interpreted § 1981 and Title VII similarly in regard to
proof required to establish a prima facie violation and rebuttal evidence by the defendant,
it seems logical that a change in defendant's rebuttal evidence under Title VII will be read
into § 1981 cases. See notes 63-64 supra and accompanying text. The Supreme Court,
however, has not yet explicitly considered the kind of proof required by plaintiff to
establish a § 1981 or § 1982 violation. See notes 188-197 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 1978:211
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an employer could demonstrate the job relatedness of a test or practice by
showing that an employee's test performance correlated with his job
training program performance rather than his job performance.' 87 If a
prima facie case of racial discrimination can thus be more easily rebutted,
the advantages of Title VII's less stringent proof requirement will disap-
pear. To succeed, a plaintiff would be forced to demonstrate a dis-
criminatory intent or purpose.
The significance of McCrary may also turn on whether racial discrimi-
nation must be one of or the sole reason for a refusal to contract.
Following Jones, the Seventh Circuit held, in Smith v. Sol D. Adler
Realty Co. ,188 that a defendant violated section 1982 when race was one
of several reasons for his refusal to contract with the plaintiff.' 89 Al-
though Adler is consistent with lower court Title VII and section 1981
employment discrimination cases, the Supreme Court has carefully noted
in its 1866 Civil Rights Act decisions that the plaintiffs were denied their
rights solely because of their color. 190 The Court continued this pattern in
McCrary by accepting, without discussion, the trial court's finding that
the plaintiffs were denied admission solely on the basis of race. 191 The
187. 426 U.S. at 249-51.
188. 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1971).
189. Id. at 349-50. See Madison v. Jeffers, 494 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1974) (defendant
refuted charge that race was a factor in his refusal to sell plaintiff property with subjective
statement of his intent; dissent urged that rebuttal of prima facie case of racial discrimina-
tion under § 1981 or § 1982 should be governed by Title VII standards: "When a
person announces withdrawal of property from the market after he, or his agent, learns
that the prospective purchaser is black, I would require him to prove that withdrawal
served a business or other rational purpose." Id. at 118); Johnson v. Jerry Pals Real
Estate, 485 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1973) (on the basis of the number of blacks in the town and
evidence of a racial slur having been made, court concluded race was a factor in the
refusal to deal); Stevens v. Dobbs, Inc., 483 F.2d 82, 83-84 (4th Cir. 1973) (violation
of § 1982 when race is an "important element" in a refusal to deal); Pughsley v. 3750
Lake Shore Drive Coop. Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055, 1056 (7th Cir. 1972) (if race was a factor in
refusal to deal, § 1982 was violated).
190. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 455 (1975) (Court
noted that EEOC " 'Final Investigation Report' supported petitioner's claims of racial
discrimination"); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreational Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S. 431, 438
(1973) (Court found "no plan or purpose of exclusiveness" except race); Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 236 (1969) (Court noted that there was "no selective
element other than race"); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,412 (1968) (Court
noted that "petitioners. . .alleged that the respondents refused to sell them a home...
for the sole reason that petitioner . . . is a Negro").
191. 427 U.S. at 165-66. See Note, supra note 59, at 430-32.
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Court may have accepted the district court's finding because it believed
the lower court had determined that the children would have been
admitted "but for" their race. McCrary would then limit section 1981 at
least as it applies to contracts involving private schools; a plaintiff will
rarely be able to meet this proof burden and a defendant, by demonstrat-
ing that it relied on subjective criteria such as recommendation letters,
will escape liability under section 1981.192
If the Court is requiring a "but for" test in its 1866 Civil Rights Act
cases, it is likely to require the same test in section 1981 and Title VII
employment discrimination cases.193 In view of the Court's recent
contraction of the fourteenth amendment, 194 it is conceivable that it will
similarly limit Title VII and section 1981 by increasing the plaintiff's
initial burden of proof. The Fifth Circuit, however, interpreted McCrary
more broadly in Riley v. Adirondack Southern School for Girls.195 Like
McCrary, the plaintiff claimed that she was denied admission to a
private school because of her race. The court conceded that certain
language in McCrary suggested the Supreme Court had incorporated a
"but for" test into section 1981, but noted that at another point in its
opinion the McCrary Court expansively defined the scope of section
1981: " 'It is now well established that § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866. . .prohibits racial discrimination in the making and enforcement
of private contracts.' "196 Because racial discrimination arises whenever
race is a factor in the refusal to contract, tht court held, McCrary
required a finding of a section 1.981 violation in all cases in which race
was one factor motivating the defendant's refusal to deal with the
plaintiff. 197
192. See, e.g., Riley v. Adirondack S. School for Girls, 368 F. Supp. 392 (M.D. Fla.
1973), rev'd, 541 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1976). Although the district court recognized that race
was one of several factors resulting in the plaintiff's rejection, it denied relief on the
theory that, "[u]nless it can be found that, but for race the complainant would have
succeeded, there is no denial of the rights assured by § 1981." Id. at 398. Employment of
the "but for" test allows the defendant to justify the challenged action with subjective
criteria that may be mere pretexts.
193. See notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text.
194. See notes 39-44 supra and accompanying text.
195. 541 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1976).
196. Id. at 1126 (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. at 168).
197. Id. at 1126. It must be noted, however, that the court closely scrutinized the
defendant's nonracial reasons for refusing to admit the plaintiff and concluded they were
all spurious. On the facts of Riley, therefore, the defendant's refusal to contract was
based solely on racial grounds. Id.
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B. Implications of McCrary for Broad Court Ordered Desegregation
Plans and Affirmative Action Legislation
Assuming that a section 1981 violation may be established by the less
stringent proof requirements discussed above, a court may then fashion a
remedy to correct the effects of the statutory violation. In both Title VII
and section 1981 employment cases, lower federal courts have fashioned
broad remedies to make the injured party whole, even though the remedy
may injure innocent persons.198 The Eighth Circuit embraced an absolute
hiring preference based on race in Carter v. Gallagher,199 explaining:
[W]e hesitate to advocate implementation of one constitutional guaran-
tee by the outright denial of another. Yet we acknowledge the legitima-
cy of erasing the effects of past racial discriminatory practices ...
To accommodate these conflicting considerations, we think some rea-
sonable ratio for hiring minority persons who can qualify under the
revised qualification standards is in order for a limited period of time,
or until there is a fair approximation of minority representation consis-
tent with the population mix in the area.2°°
These remedies include affirmative action programs,201 racial preference
198. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975) provides in pertinent part:
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in . . . an
unlawful employment practice charged in the complaint, the court may enjoin the
respondent from engaging in such unlawful employment practice, and order such
affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include, but is not limited
to, reinstatement or hiring of employees, with or without backpay. . . or any
other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate.
The Fifth Circuit explained the "make whole" principle in Watkins v. Scott Paper
Co., 530 F.2d 1159 (5th Cir. 1976), as follows:
In Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 5 Cir. 1974, 491 F.2d 1364,
1367, we observed that "federal remedial legislation has created a right of action
ensuring that a discriminatee may be made whole for an employer's miscon-
duct." (emphasis added). . . . The rule. . . recently endorsed by the Supreme
Court in Franks v. Bowman . . . is that blacks previously discriminated against
mus t be given such remedial relief as to enable them to achieve their "rightful
place" in an employer's employment hierarchy. The rightful place theory is an
equitable accommodation between two countervailing interests. The first interest
is that of prior discriminatees to achieve what would have been theirs in the
absence of discrimination. The countervailing interests are those of employers,
employees, and consumers-in maintaining safety and efficiency-and those of
employees who acquired their positions within the discriminating system and
would suffer unfairly if required to give up such positions to members of an
affected class.
Id. at 1167-68. See generally Note, Last Hired, First Fired-Layoffs and Title VII, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1544 (1975).
199. 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
200. Id. at 330.
201. See, e.g., Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 895
(1974); EEOC v. Local 2P, Litho. & Photoengravers I.U., 412 F. Supp. 530 (D. Md. 1976).
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hiring quotas, 202 reinstatement, 203 back pay,2° and constructive seniori-
ty.205 Courts have also ordered the discontinuance of hiring and promo-
tional policies that had a racially discriminatory effect2°6 and held that
under special circumstances relief could be extended to persons dis-
suaded from applying for a job because of discriminatory practices.20 7
202. See, e.g., NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974); Carter v. Gallagher, 452
F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); United States v. Ironworkers
Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); Nowlin v. Pruitt, 417
F. Supp. 408 (N.D. Ind. 1976); Sherrill v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 410 F. Supp. 770 (W.D.N.C.
1975), aff'd mem., 551 F.2d 308 (4th Cir. 1977).
203. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Long v. Ford
Motor Co., 496 F.2d 500 (6th Cir. 1974).
204. See, e.g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
205. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971); Local 189, United Papermakers and
Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919
(1970).
206. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
207. See Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976). In this sex discrimination layoff
case involving women police officers who had been last hired and first fired in accordance
with the New York City Police Department seniority system, the court held that "[iff a
female police officer can show that, except for her sex, she would have been hired early
enough to accumulate sufficient seniority to withstand the current layoffs, then her layoff
violates section 703(a)(1) of Title VII .... ."Id. at 654. Although the court noted
that the distinction between seniority from the date of hire and earlier, construc-
tive seniority seems attractive because of the unstated moral premise that it is
wrong to give seniority credit to one who did not work for it. . . . the limited
number of employees who might get such seniority here were prevented by
defendants' wrongdoing from attaining it before.
1d, at 655.
A plaintiff could satisfy the burden of proof by demonstrating that she
actually filed an application for employment or wrote a letter complaining about
the hiring policy early enough during the period of discrimination, or offer proof
that she had expressed a desire to enlist in the police force but was deterred by
the discriminatory practice barring females. Relief will, of course, be limited to
persons who eventually were accepted as police officers, so there is no question
about their qualifications for the job.
Id. at 656. Although this burden was stiff, Chief Judge Kaufman, concurring, explained
the equities involved in the constructive seniority relief at issue here:
It is conceivable that the standard of proof we require may be difficult or
impossible to meet for some female police officers who took no overt action with
regard to employment in the Police Department during the years in which
discrimination in hiring prevailed. Nor would it be appropriate to interpret our
holding as stating that some female officers will be put into a favored position to
claim that relief must be automatic even though they cannot establish that the
prior discrimination in any way deterred them from, or interfered with their quest
for, employment in the Police Department. The proof required should not pose a
problem in the future, however, in view of the notice our opinion provides to all.
Moreover, because of the male police officers' important countervailing interest,
we believe it inappropriate to establish a special or double standard for the
plaintiffs before us, even though they obviously had no notice, at the time they
suffered discrimination, of the requirements we now impose.
Id. at 657.
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The Supreme Court in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.208 endors-
ed broad Title VII remedies for identifiable victims of employment
discrimination even though white employees claimed the remedies sub-
jected them to reverse discrimination. 2 9
The McCrary Court, finding that racially discriminatory admissions
procedures in private schools violated section 1981, could have remand-
ed the case to the district court with instructions to fashion a remedy that
would make the plaintiffs whole by placing them in the position they
would have been in but for the discrimination.21 0 In light of the creative
remedies courts have devised in employment discrimination cases to
effectuate the make whole principle,21' the district court could have
directed the private schools to admit not only the students actually
discriminated against, but all black students who were discouraged from
applying to the schools because of their notorious racial policies. 212 To
ensure that the plaintiffs were made whole the court could also have
required the schools to actively recruit black applicants because, had the
schools not employed discriminatory admissions policies, other black
208. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
209. The Court held:
[D]enial of seniority relief to identifiable victims of racial discrimination on the
sole ground that such relief diminishes the expectations of other, arguably
innocent, employees would if applied generally frustrate the central "make
whole" objective of Title VII. These conflicting interests of other employees
will, of course, always be present in instances where some scarce employment
benefit is distributed among employees on the basis of their status in the seniority
hierarchy. But . . . there is nothing in the language of Title VII, or in its
legislative history, to show that Congress intended generally to bar this form of
relief to victims of illegal discrimination ....
Id. at 774. Chief Justice Burger, concurring, expressed concern over such relief:
[A]lthough retroactive benefit-type seniority relief may sometimes be appropri-
ate and equitable, competitive-type seniority relief at the expense of wholly
innocent employees can rarely, if ever, be equitable if that term retains tradition-
al meaning. More equitable would be a monetary award to the person suffering
the discrimination. . . . In every respect an innocent employee is comparable to
a "holder-in-due-course" of negotiable paper or a bona fide purchaser of proper-
ty without notice of any defect in the seller's title. In this setting I cannot join in
judicial approval of "robbing Peter to pay Paul."
Id. at 780-81.
210. See Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976). The Second Circuit noted that the
congressional intention in amending Title VII in 1972 was "'to give courts wide discre-
tion exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most complete relief possible' and to
restore aggrieved persons 'to the position where they would have been if not for the
unlawful discrimination.'" Id. at 654-55 (quoting legislative history of Equal Employment
Opportunity Act). In fact, the McCrary Court simply affirmed the Court of Appeals
decision in all respects, 426 U.S. at 186. See note 115 supra.
211. See notes 201-09 supra and accompanying text.
212. See Acha v. Beame, discussion, supra note 207.Washington University Open Scholarship
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students arguably would have been admitted and the plaintiffs would
have been attending integrated schools.21 3
The implications of this discussion are obvious: a student denied
admission to a university or professional school may, under McCrary,
allege that race was one factor motivating the university's action in
violation of his section 1981 "same right" to contract.21 4 He could
establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination by demonstrating that
the school's admission procedures included use of a standardized test that
had a racially disproportionate impact on admissions. The burden would
then shift to the university to prove a necessity for the test and a
213. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975) (One of Title VII's
purposes is "to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employ-
ment discrimination."). This position was generally endorsed in Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764-66 (1976) ("Adequate relief may well be denied in the
absence of a seniority remedy slotting the victim in that position in the seniority system
that would have been his had he been hired at the time of his application.").
214. Although a university may voluntarily adopt a preferential treatment-affirmative
action program, the Court has not yet determined its constitutionality against an equal
protection or § 1981 claim by an injured innocent person. See Bakke v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted 429
U.S. 1090 (1977); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); note 253
infra.
In Germann v. Kipp, 429 F. Supp. 1323 (W.D. Mo. 1977), the court upheld a
voluntary affirmative action program adopted by the Kansas City Fire Department to
meet federal standards for the employment of women and minority groups. It subjected
the department's program to very strict scrutiny, however:
In the absence of a finding of specific past discrimination requiring specific
relief, there can be no doubt that an employer must make a clear and convincing
showing of an acceptable basis for the affirmative action plan which is temporar-
ily imposed and reasonably drawn to meet the demonstrated need. While such a
showing admittedly places a difficult burden of justification upon an employer,
this Court believes that an employer who meets that burden may establish the
validity of a plan which grants a preference to minorities even if it necessarily
results in detriment to the majority. Whenever there is a limited pool of resources
from which minorities have been disproportionately excluded, equalization of
opportunity can only be accomplished by reallocation of those resources.
Id. at 1335.
The court in Detroit Police Officers Ass'n v. Young, 46 U.S.L.W. 2463 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 14, 1978), however, considered a similar Detroit Police Department voluntary
affirmative action program that established a quota for the promotion of black police
officers solely on the basis of race and struck it down as violative of Title VII, the
fourteenth amendment, and § 1981. Absent proof of prior discrimination, a promotion
plan based on race, whether voluntarily adopted or judicially mandated, violates section
703(a) of Title VII. Furthermore, even when proof of racial discrimination is present, only
a court ordered remedy incorporating a racial quota is constitutional under section 706(g)
because Congress was cognizant that courts alone are in a position to afford due process
to all concerned in determining the necessity for relief from prior discriminatory practices.
Because the promotion system discriminated against whites in violation of Title VII, the
court held as a matter of law that it also violated § 1981.
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relationship between it and academic performance.215 If the defendant
failed to meet the burden, the court, exercising its equity powers, could
order a broad affirmative action or admissions quota program.
2 16
Broader implications for affirmative action programs arise out of
McCrary. In 1966, the Supreme Court in South Carolina v. Katzen-
bach217 upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965218 as a legitimate exercise
of Congress' remedial powers under section 2 of the fifteenth amend-
ment. 219 The Court pointed to numerous litigated cases demonstrating
racial discrimination in past administration of state voting qualifications
and held that Congress could reasonably have concluded "that
continuance of the tests and devices in use at the present time, no matter
how fairly administered in the future, would freeze the effects of past
discrimination in favor of unqualified white registrants. "220 Congress
The court further held that the affirmative action program discriminated against
whites in violation of the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause and that the
defendant had not met its burden of showing the racial classification served a compelling
state interest or that there was no less restrictive means of accomplishing this interest. The
court, after closely scrutinizing the program, concluded:
The evil of the departmental quota system lies in its effect, not in its
"affirmative action" name. While the purpose of a quota system is generally
compassionate its effect is intolerable because it denigrates individuals by reduc-
ing them to a single immutable birth characteristic-skin pigmentation. The
concept of a quota disregards the fact that persons are not fungible goods and
that special qualifications may be required for the job in question. It prefers
some while excluding others on the basis of an attribute totally unconnected with
the merits of the promotional candidate.
Racial discrimination is as indefensible when practiced against whites as it is
when practiced against blacks and does not become "reverse" merely because it
is practiced against whites. "Reverse" discrimination is a misnomer as racial
discrimination knows neither a course nor a direction. The keystone of a democ-
ratic government is the concept of equality, and to judge discrimination against
whites in a different manner, when the same discrimination is practiced against
blacks, would be to resurrect the "separate but equal" doctrine, a philosophy
presumably buried long ago.
!d. at 2464.
To avoid application of this difficult test and a possible holding of unconstitutionality
by the Supreme Court, blacks should attack the institution's policies under the less
stringent proof requirements of § 1981 and obtain a decision that their constitutional
rights have been violated.
215. See notes 45-50,180-87 supra and accompanying text.
216. See notes 198-209 supra and accompanying text.
217. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
218. Act of Aug. 6, 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
1973a-d (Supp. V 1975).
219. 383 U.S. at 327-28. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2 provides that "Congress shall
have the power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
220. 383 U.S. at 334. The Court reasoned:
Congress exercised its authority under the Fifteenth Amendment in an
inventive manner when it enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965. First: The
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thus had the power to enact a statute, national in scope, to remedy the
vestiges of past discrimination. 221
A few months later, in Katzenbach v. Morgan,222 the Court con-
sidered the scope of Congress' enforcement power under section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment. 223 The Court relied on South Carolina v.
Katzenbach and expansively interpreted Congress' section 5 power224
to sustain the Voting Rights Act provision that compelled New York to
extend the franchise to Puerto Ricans who, although illiterate in English,
had completed the sixth grade.2z Justice Brennan, writing for the Court,
held that the issue was not "whether the judiciary would find that the
Equal Protection Clause itself nullifies New York's English literacy re-
quirement as so applied," but rather, whether Congress could "prohibit
the enforcement of the state law by legislating under § 5 of the Fourteenth
measure prescribes remedies for voting discrimination which go into effect
without any need for prior adjudication. This was clearly a legitimate response to
the problem, for which there is ample precedent under other constitutional
provisions. . . .Congress had found that case-by-case litigation was inadequate
to combat widespread and persistent discrimination in voting, because of the
inordinate amount of time and energy required to overcome the obstructionist
tactics invariably encountered in these lawsuits. After enduring nearly a century
of systematic resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress might well
decide to shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators of the evil
to its victims.
Id. at 327-28.
The importance of legislative findings is discussed in Alfange, The Relevance of
Legislative Facts in Constitutional Law, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 637 (1966); Karst, Legislative
Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 75.
221. 383 U.S. 301, 327-28 (1966).
222. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). See generally Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 Sup. CT.
REV. 79; Nichol, An Examination of Congressional Powers Under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 175 (1976); Note, Private Interference with an Indi-
vidual's Civil Rights: A Redressable Wrong Under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 51
NOTRE DAME LAW. 120 (1976).
223. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 provides that "Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." See generally Frantz,
Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73
YALE L.J. 1353 (1964); Developments: Congressional Power Under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, 25 STAN. L. REV. 885 (1975).
224. 384 U.S. at 648-51.
225. Id. at 658. Section 4(e)(2) of the Voting Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat.
439 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (1970) (amended 1975)) provides in pertinent part:
No person who demonstrates that he has successfully completed the sixth
primary grade in a public school in, or a private school accredited by, any State
or Territory, the District of Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in
which the predominant classroom language was other than English, shall be
denied the right to vote in any Federal, State, or local election because of his
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Amendment? In answering this question," the Court held, "our task is
limited to determining whether such legislation is, as required by § 5,
appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause." 226 The
Court held that the superficial review standard established in McCulloch
v. Maryland2 7 was appropriate because "[c]orrectly viewed, § 5 is a
positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its
discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to
secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.' '228 Because
Congress had superior factfinding capacity and could engage in extensive
legislative investigations, the Court would defer to a legislative determi-
nation, as long as
we perceive a basis upon which Congress might predicate a judgment
that the application of New York's English literacy requirement to
deny the right to vote to a person with a sixth grade education in Puerto
Rican schools in which the language of instruction was other than
English constituted an invidious discrimination in violation of the
226. 384 U.S. at 649-50.
The Seventh Circuit recently endorsed this expansive reading of § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment in United States v. City of Chicago, 46 U.S.L.W. 2464 (7th Cir. Mar. 14,
1978). The city argued on the basis of the tenth amendment, endorsed in National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 248 (1976), that
Title VII, as applied to state and local governments by the 1972 amendments to the 1964
Civil Rights Act constitutionally based on § 5 of the fourteenth amendment, must incorpo-
rate the "intent to discriminate" requirement to state a valid racial discrimination-equal
protection claim under the fourteenth amendment. The Court, quoting Katzenbach v.
Morgan, rejected this claim, and held that the Griggs test (proof of discriminatory impact)
was sufficient to prove a Title VII discrimination claim against a state as well as a private
employer. The court reasoned that a statute enacted under § 5 was constitutional if it was
'appropriate legislation" and was "plainly adapted to that end and. . . not prohibited by
but is consistent with the letter and the spirit of the constitution." Therefore,
[tihis case is governed by the same principles. The 1972 amendments were
enacted to enforce the anti-discrimination prohibitions of the Equal Protection
Clause and are plainly adapted to that end. It was well within the congressional
authority to weigh the competing policy considerations and determine that public
employees required the same safeguards against discrimination given to private
employees by the Griggs standard. Thus, since the 1972 amendments are clearly
rationally related to and consistent with the letter and the spirit of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and since the means chosen were not unconstitutional, the court
concludes that Congress could constitutionally incorporate the Griggs test into
the 1972 amendments.
46 U.S.L.W. at 2465.
227. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). The standard of review is: "Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropri-
ate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with
the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." Id. at 421.
228. 384 U.S. at 651.
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Equal Protection Clause. 229
In Oregon v. Mitchell,2° the Court retreated from this expansive
definition of Congress' enforcement power under the Civil War Amend-
ments. Justice Stewart, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Black-
mun,231 agreed with Justices Black 232 and Harlan233 that section 5 of
the fourteenth amendment did not empower Congress to compel states to
lower their voting age requirement to eighteen. 234 Justice Black, concur-
ring separately, noted three limitations on Congress' section 5 power:
first, it could not legislate to repeal other constitutional provisions;
second, it could not strip the states of their power to govern them-
selves; and third, it could not deny to others the fourteenth amend-
ment's guarantee of personal equality and freedom from discrimina-
tion. 35 The Court would, however, construe Congress' power under the
Civil War Amendments broadly when it legislated against racial dis-
crimination .236
229. Id. at 656 (emphasis added).
230. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
231. Id. at 293.
232. Id. at 129-30. Justice Black distinguished Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966), and South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), which upheld other
sections of the 1965 Voting Rights Act:
In Katzenbach v. Morgan, supra, the Court upheld a statute which outlawed
New York's requirement of literacy in English as a prerequisite to voting as this
requirement was applied to Puerto Ricans with certain educational qualifications.
The New York statute overridden by Congress applied to all elections, and in
South Carolina v. Katzenbach . . . the Court upheld the literacy test ban of the
Voting Rights Act of 1965. That Act proscribed the use of the literacy test in all
elections in certain areas. But division of power between state and national
governments, like every provision of the Constitution, was expressly qualified
by the Civil War Amendments' ban on racial discrimination. Where Congress
attempts to remedy racial discrimination under its enforcement powers, its
authority is enhanced by the avowed intention of the framers of the Thirteenth,
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments.
400 U.S. at 129-30.
233. Id. at 210.
234. Id. at 293.
235. Id. at 128.
236. Id. at 126-27. Justice Black stated:
The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments have ex-
pressly authorized Congress to "enforce" the limited prohibitions of those
amendments by "appropriate legislation."
Above all else, the framers of the Civil War Amendments intended to deny
to the States the power to discriminate against persons on account of their race
... . While this Court has recognized that the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment in some instances protects against discriminations other
than those on account of race . . . . the Civil War Amendments were unques-
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The Mitchell Court concluded that Congress could have determined
that the continuing effects of documented voting and educational dis-
crimination could be removed only by a nationwide statutory remedy.237
Therefore, the Court held, under South Carolina v. Katzenbach and the
fifteenth amendment, that the 1970 Voting Rights Act amendment,
which imposed a five year nationwide ban on the use of literacy tests for
voting qualifications, was a legitimate exercise of Congress' power.238
The Court specifically noted in Katzenbach v. Morgan that the Voting
Rights Act was devised to grant fourteenth amendment rights to persons
denied them because of the continuing effects of past discrimination.
Moreover, the challenged provision did not deprive any person of his
right to vote in order to extend the franchise to persons who otherwise
would have been denied it by state law; it thus did not impinge the
constitutional rights of innocent persons. 2 9 In Mitchell, Justice Black,
concurring, concluded that Congress could not enact remedial legislation
that would interfere with the rights of others; 2' he conceded, however,
that the Court must interpret Congress' enforcement power more expan-
sively when employed to remove the continuing effects of racial dis-
crimination.24'
It is, therefore, uncertain whether the Court would uphold a statute
enacted under the enforcement clauses of the thirteenth, fourteenth, or
fifteenth amendments, which, by granting preferential treatment to one
race to eradicate the vestiges of discrimination, infringed the rights of
another race. 242 Lower courts243 have recently considered this question
237. Id. at 131-34.
238. Id. at 118.
239. 384 U.S. at 656-59.
240. See note 235 supra and accompanying text. Justice White, joined by Justices
Stevens and Rehnquist, reaffirmed this position in United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v.
Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977), stating: "There is no doubt that in preparing the 1974
legislation, the State deliberately used race in a purposeful manner. But its plan repre-
sented no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites or any other race, and we discern no
discrimination violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . ." Id. at 165. But see Justice
Brennan's concurring opinion in which he noted: "I believe, therefore, that the history of
equitable decrees utilizing racial criteria fairly establishes the broad principle that race
may play a legitimate role in remedial policies." Id. at 172 n.2.
241. See note 236 supra; Note, The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary
Analysis, supra note 23, at 1308-20.
242. For a discussion of whether the effects of past discrimination suffered by one
group may be remedied by preferential treatment that has an adverse impact on another
group, see Greenawalt, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference in Law School
Admissions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 559 (1975); Griswold, Some Observations on the DeFunis
Case, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 512 (1975); Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World:
Number I1I
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while construing the constitutionality of the 1977 Public Works Employ-
ment Act provision that requires:
Except to the extent that the Secretary determines otherwise, no
grant shall be made under this Act for any local public works project
unless the applicant gives satisfactory assurance to the Secretary that
at least 10 per centum of the amount of each grant shall be expended
for minority business enterprises. 244
A federal district court in Pennsylvania, 245 denying an equal protection
attack, held that the preferential treatment provision was an appropriate
Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 363 (1966);
Karst & Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REV. 955 (1974);
Nickel, Preferential Policies in Hiring and Admission: A Jurisprudential Approach, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 534 (1975); O'Neil, RacialPreferences and Higher Education: The Larger
Context, 60 VA. L. REV. 925 (1974); Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education:
Political Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CH. L. REV. 653 (1975).
243. See, e.g., Wright Farms Constr., Inc. v. Kreps, 444 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Vt. 1977).
The court upheld the use of quotas to remedy the injury caused by racial discrimination.
After closely scrutinizing congressional findings justifying the Act, however, it concluded
that because there was no racial discrimination in Vermont, the Act was unconstitutional
as applied.
In Fullilove v. Kreps, 443 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), the court endorsed the use
of racial classifications to remedy the invidious effects of past racial discrimination in
§§ 1981, 1983, 1984, and Title VII actions as well as in this Act. Although it acknowledged
that the legislative findings of racial discrimination supporting the Act were ambiguous,
the court inferred from available empirical data and congressional action in the past 10
years, that Congress intended by this Act to remedy the effects of prior discrimination
against minority businesses seeking to participate in government contracting.
In Associated Gen. Contractors v. Secretary of Commerce, 441 F. Supp. 955 (C.D.
Cal. 1977), the court held that the 10% quota constituted a classification based on race and
was subject to strict scrutiny. Under this test it was unconstitutional because it was
supported by no compelling state interest and it was not the least restrictive alternative. Of
quotas, the court emphatically stated: "Quotas are absolutely invidious and unconstitu-
tional. . . . All discrimination solely on the basis of race or national origin, direct or
reverse, converse or inverse, is invidious and unconstitutional." Id. at 966.
Three district courts have upheld the public works provision and eight have refused to
grant preliminary injunctions to prohibit its enforcement. N.Y. Times, Apr. 2, 1978, § F,
at 6, col. 2.
244. 42 U.S.C.A. § 6705(0(2) (Supp. II, Sept. 1977).
For the purposes of this paragraph, the term "minority business enterprises"
means a business at least 50 per centum of which is owned by minority group
members or, in case of a publicly owned business, at least 51 per centum of the
stock of which is owned by minority group members. For the purposes of the
preceding sentence, minority group members are citizens of the United States
who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts.
Id.
245. Constructors Ass'n v. Kreps, 441 F. Supp. 936 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 46
U.S.L.W. 2549 (3d Cir. Apr. 18, 1978).
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exercise of Congress' power to enforce the Civil War Amendments. 246 It
acknowledged that whenever a legislative classification is based on race,
courts must scrutinize it closely to determine whether the classification is
justified by a compelling state need and the means chosen are the least
restrictive.247 In this case, Congress had made a finding of past racial
discrimination in the construction industry and enacted the challenged
provision to remedy it; the means chosen were necessary under the
circumstances. 241 The Third Circuit affirmed.249
In Associated General Contractors v. Secretary of Commerce,250 on
the other hand, a California district court held the minority quota law
unconstitutional and enjoined future allocation of federal funds subject to
the quota requirement. The court stated that "[a]ll discrimination solely
on the basis of race or national origin, direct or reverse, converse or
inverse, is invidious and unconstitutional. "25 The only justification for
the statutory provision, the court noted, was to prefer one race over
another; "[i]t is not a permissible government objective to direct finan-
cial assistance to segments of the community which are classified solely
on the basis of race to the exclusion of other segments.' '12 The Supreme
Court's forthcoming decision in Bakke v. Regents of the University of
California, involving a challenge to a state medical school's voluntary
adoption of a race preference admissions policy, may not be determina-
tive of this issue.53 Appeals of both Public Works Employment Act
246. 441 F. Supp. 947. The court noted that "Congress has a special responsibility for
interpreting and enforcing the Civil Rights Amendments to the Constitution. . . and has
in the past authorized expenditures for such measures, the most recent of which is the
Public Works Employment Act .... ." Id. It surveyed the several contexts in which
Congress and the courts have recognized race as a permissible criterion to remedy the
effects of past discrimination. Id. at 947-49.
247. Id. at 949-50.
248. Id. at 950-54. The court exhibited extreme deference to the congressional finding
of past discrimination, noting: "While the lack of legislative history to support the
purpose of the statute is troublesome, the court cannot say that the statute is so crude that
we cannot discern its remedial purpose." Id. at 952.
249. 46 U.S.L.W. 2549 (3d Cir. April 18, 1978).
250. 441 F. Supp. 955 (C.D. Cal. 1977), petition for cert. filed, 46 U.S.L.W. 3497(U.S.
Jan. 31, 1978) (No. 77-1078).
251. Id. at 966.
252. Id. at 965.
253. See Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1090 (1977). The court held that a voluntary
affirmative action program giving absolute preference to minority students for sixteen
places in the first year class of a state university medical school on the basis of race
violated the fourteenth amendment rights of nonminorities to be free from racial discrimi-
nation. The court noted, however, that when a court finds a defendant guilty of past
Number I1]
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cases are being taken to the Court. 4
The Court held in McCrary that Congress could define "badges of
slavery" and, under the thirteenth amendment's enforcement clause,
discriminatory acts, preferential treatment is permissible as a remedy for the equality that
the plaintiff would have had but for the past discrimination. The court stated:
Absent a finding of past discrimination-and thus the need for remedial meas-
ures to compensate minorities for the prior discriminatory practices of the
employer-the federal courts, with one exception, have held that the preferential
treatment of minorities in employment is invalid on the ground that it deprives a
member of the majority of a benefit because of his race. [citations omitted]
It is important to observe that all of these cases . hold that it is uncon-
stitutional reverse discrimination to grant a preference to a minority employee in
the absence of a showing of prior discrimination by the particular employer
granting the preference. Obviously, this principle would apply whether the
preference was compelled by a court or voluntarily initiated by the employer
... . [T]here is no merit in the assertion of the dissent that there is some
undefined constitutional significance to the fact that the University elected to
adopt the special admission program and was not compelled to do so by court
order. To the victim of racial discrimination the result is not noticeably different
under either circumstance.
Id. at 57-59, 533 P.2d at 1168-69, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 696-97.
Because the affirmative action program challenged in Bakke was adopted voluntarily
and is not a court ordered or legislatively enacted remedy to correct the effects of past
discriminatory acts in violation of the Constitution, the Supreme Court's decision in
Bakke may not resolve the constitutionality of the statutes discussed herein. Although the
Supreme Court in Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), generally en-
dorsed broad Title VII remedies against claims by white employees that the remedies sub-
jected them to reverse discrimination, it held in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,
427 U.S. 273 (1976), that whites as well as blacks could bring claims for discrimination in
contracting under § 1981. If the preferential treatment program were voluntarily adopted,
arguably an innocent individual injured by its operation could bring a Title VII (employ-
ment) or § 1981 claim. The court, in a footnote, acknowledged that its decision in
McDonald raised such a possibility but withheld judgment on it. Justice White, for the
majority, commented: "Santa Fe disclaims that actions challenged here were any part of
an affirmative action program. . .and we emphasize that we do not consider here the
permissibility of such a program, whether judicially required or otherwise prompted." Id.
at 281 n.8.
If the Court endorses the University of California's affirmative action program this
Term against the claim of an injured white person, the constitutionality of the legislative
and court ordered remedies discussed herein would seem ensured. Should the Court
affirm the California Supreme Court's decision and strike down the program as violative
of the equal protection clause, the constitutionality of remedial legislation, based on the
enforcement clause of the thirteenth amendment, will remain unresolved.
254. Associated General Contractors v. Secretary of Commerce, 441 F. Supp. 955
(C.D. Cal. 1977), petition for cert. filed,-; Construction Ass'n v. Kreps, 441 F. Supp. 936
(W.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, - F.2d - (1978), petition for cert. filed, -. Although the Justice
Department has urged the Court to deny certiorari on mootness grounds because all the
money appropriated under the special public works program has been allocated, it seems
unlikely that the Court will agree. As a practical matter, this result would leave the
unconstitutionality decision in effect in central California and nowhere else. See N.Y.
Times, Apr. 2, 1978, § F, at 6, col. 1.
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enact appropriate legislation to abolish them. It further ruled that
Congress could reasonably have determined that racial discrimination in
contracting was such a badge, and therefore abolished it under section
1981. 25 Under the remedial theory developed in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, Katzenbach v. Morgan, and Oregon v. Mitchell, 56
Congress could find that the consequences of past and present racial
discrimination in contracting are pervasive and that efforts to eliminate
such discrimination have failed. It could also conclude that litigation
under section 1981 would be ineffective because the denial of a right to
contract to obtain quality education, employment, and housing in the past
had such a debilitating effect on blacks that, regardless of how scrupul-
ously section 1981 was enforced in the future, it could not remedy the
invidious consequences of past discrimination. 25 7
Congress could therefore enact a broad, nationwide, remedial statute
to eliminate the effects of discrimination in contracting. 25 8 Finding that a
limited number of blacks attend professional schools despite repeated
federal government attempts to stimulate affirmative action admissions
programs, Congress could require that, for a specified period, these
schools must admit a certain percentage of minority students each year.
A similar statute relating to employment and housing could be enacted.
Although the constitutionality of such statutes is unclear, 25 9 courts
255. See notes 121-23 supra and accompanying text.
256. See notes 217-38 supra and accompanying text.
257. The Court deferred to legislative findings in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301 (1966), and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), and might do the same in
the case proposed here. See notes 220 & 229 supra and accompanying text.
258. Justice Stewart noted in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), that Congress, in
the interest of uniformity, could enact a nationwide remedy even if it did not find evidence
of racial discrimination in every state:
Nationwide application reduces the danger that federal intervention will be
perceived as unreasonable discrimination against particular States or particular
regions of the country. This in turn increases the likelihood of voluntary
compliance with the letter and spirit of federal law. Nationwide application
facilitates the free movement of citizens from one State to another, since it
eliminates the prospect that a change in residence will mean the loss of a
federally protected right. Nationwide application avoids the often difficult task
of drawing a line between those States where a problem is pressing enough to
warrant federal intervention and those where it is not. Such a line may well
appear discriminatory to those who think themselves on the wrong side of it.
Moreover the application of the line to particular States can entail a substantial
burden on administrative and judicial machinery and a diversion of enforcement
resources.
In the interests of uniformity, Congress may paint with a much broader brush
than may this Court, which must confine itself to the judicial function of deciding
individual cases and controversies upon individual records.
Id. at 283-84.
259. See notes 242-53 supra and accompanying text.
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have recognized that Congress has wide discretion to remedy past dis-
crimination and have upheld the specified percentage goals and time
tables for minority hiring in the Philadelphia, Cleveland, Newark, and
Illinois Ogilvie Plans.2W6 In light of the Court's deference to Congress'
legislative action under the Civil War Amendments in the past,261 it is
here suggested that the Court will uphold the constitutionality of the 1977
Public Works Employment Act262 and, if enacted, the remedial statutes
outlined above. Innocent persons who suffer discrimination as a result of
these remedial statutes and court orders may more profitably argue that
the infringement of their rights is so great in relation to the injury the
statute was designed to remedy that their due process right to fair
treatment under the law is violated.263
VII. CONCLUSION
The Court confronted the problem of "segregation academies" in
Runyon v. McCrary264 and held that section 1981, derived from the 1866
Civil Rights Act and the thirteenth amendment, prohibited discrimination
in contracting for admission to private, commercially operated, nonsecta-
rian schools. Intent on narrowing the scope of the fourteenth amendment,
the Court chose not to reach private schools by expanding the state action
or public function doctrines.
Although the Court admitted that the rights of privacy, association,
and liberty were infringed by McCrary, it held that section 1981 was a
valid exercise of congressional power. The Court thus implicitly held that
260. See Southern IlI. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 327 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D. Ill. 1971),
aff'd, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972) (Illinois Ogilvie Plan); Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp.
1284 (D.N.J. 1970) (Newark Plan); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 311 F. Supp.
1003 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971)
(Philadelphia Plan); Weiner v. Cuyahoga Community College Dist., 19 Ohio St. 2d 35,249
N.E.2d 907 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004 (1970) (Cleveland Plan).
261. See notes 220 & 229 supra and accompanying text.
262. See notes 243-52 supra and accompanying text.
263. I am indebted to Professor Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Daniel Noyes Kirby Professor of
Law, Washington University, for this observation. If the Court upholds remedial legisla-
tion that gives preferential treatment to blacks despite its necessary discriminatory effect
on innocent whites, it would seem that an injured white could challenge the statute as
violative of due process. He would argue that the benefit to the group aided by the
legislation was insufficient to justify the resulting great deprivation to his liberty, that is, it
was fundamentally unfair. Cf. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (evidence
obtained in violation of a defendant's fourth amendment rights that shocked the con-
science and was repugnant to traditional notions of decency and fair play violated the due
process clause).
264. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
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society's interest in nondiscrimination in private schools was sufficiently
compelling to justify congressional action under the thirteenth amend-
ment's enforcement clause despite its infringement of other constitution-
ally protected rights.
The McCrary decision may enable the Court to order broad remedial
desegregation programs and uphold imaginative national remedial affir-
mative action legislation in employment, education, and housing.
Whether this potential is realized depends on the proof required to
establish a section 1981 violation and on the extent that remedies for
constitutional violations will be allowed to impinge the rights of innocent
parties.
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